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THE SCOPE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY'S PROTECTION OF STYLISTIC
RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION
The doctrines of the right of publicity, copyright, unfair
competition, and trademark all protect an individual's distinctive
style as intellectual property.' These distinct areas of law fre-
quently overlap. 2 In recent years, courts have extended protection
for style by blurring the distinctions between these different
legal theories and merging the tests for determining infringement
under each theory.' This extended protection creates new, hybrid
causes of action and expands the protection given to stylistic
rights beyond intellectual property law's traditional limitations. 4
Ironically, the expanded protection given to stylistic rights
threatens to destroy the traditional balance between an indivi-
dual's interest in controlling commercial use of his or her
distinctive style and the interest of the public in continued access
to style that is not intimately associated with a particular indi-
1. This Note does not cover the general scope of the right of publicity,
unfair competition, trademark, or copyright. The Note relies on these theories
to show that stylistic rights are protected and that the uncertain scope of these
rights is problematic. For further discussion of these theories see J. THOMAS
McCARTHY, THE RiGHTS oF PuBLiCITY AND PRIVACY (1992); MELVILLE B.
NBOOR & D. NIMMER, Nn&wER ON CopymnHT (1989) (explaining the law of
copyright); PAUL GOLDSTBIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED
STATE DOcTRINEs (2d ed. 1981) (emphasizing the relationship between trade-
mark, unfair competition, and related theories).
2. A person's style may be distinctive enough to invoke his or her identity,
receive copyright protection, and operate as a trademark. These are not always
discrete theories. See Christopher Pesce, Note, The Likeness Monster: Should
the Right of Publicity Protect Against Imitation?, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 782,
783 (1990) (describing this protection as a "collision of legal doctrines").
3. See Michael T. Helfand, Note, When Mickey Mouse is as Strong as
Superman: The Convergence of Intellectual Property Laws to Protect Fictional
Literary and Pictorial Characters, 44 STAN. L. REv. 623 (1992) (explaining
how the convergence of intellectual property laws has expanded protection for
fictional characters).
4. See infra part L.A (discussing how early courts limited application of
these overlapping doctrines to protect individual style).
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vidualI The current expansion of stylistic rights generates con-
fusion as to what constitutes protected style and how rights to
style can be transfered. 6 Recent rulings on these issues have
caused apprehension in the art, advertising, and entertainment
markets. People with their own distinctive style now fear losing
the right to create in that style if they sell the exclusive rights
to any of their work.7 Similarly, potential buyers of works with
stylistic components fear that buying the rights to a work may
not give them the right to use the work as they please.8
This Note addresses the problems created by the recent ex-
pansion of stylistic rights. Part I discusses the origins of stylistic
rights and traces the evolution of these rights to their present
5. See White v. Samsung Elecs. America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1408 (9th
Cir. 1992), (Alarcon, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
The protection of intellectual property presents the courts with
the necessity of balancing competing interests. On the one hand,
we wish to protect and reward the work and investment of those
who create intellectual property. In so doing, however, we must
prevent the creation of a monopoly that would inhibit the creative
expressions of otheri.
971 F.2d at 1408.
Although the balancing of public interest against individual interests was
traditionally reserved for copyright and trademark cases, at least one com-
mentator suggests that similar balancing is appropriate under the right of
publicity. See Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image. Popular
Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REv. 125 (1993). Madow argues that
complete protection of a person's identity is undesirable from a "cultural
studies" perspective. Id. at 135-47. Madow contends that extensive protection
for style locks popular images in place by preventing the public from building
upon these images. Id. at 145-46. He feels the prevention of unjust enrichment
is unnecessary in these circumstances because celebrities are generally enriched
beyond what they deserve anyway. Id. at 196-205. Madow also argues that
people would not be deterred from seeking celebrity status because other
rewards are incentive enough. Id. at 205-25.
6. See infra part II (discussing the current expansion of stylistic rights).
7. See, e.g., Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 654 F. Supp. 1129, 1132 (N.D.
Cal. 1987) (recognizing a viable copyright action against an artist accused of
copying the style of material he previously sold), rev'd on other grounds, 114
S.Ct. 1023 (1994). See also Harvey W. Geller & Thomas M. Hines, Copyright
Used to Challenge Self-Plagiarism, NAT'L. LJ., Nov. 1, 1993, at S9 (discussing
the Fogerty case's implications for stylistic rights).
8. See Susan Bibisi, Vocal Theft Leaves Ad World Speechless, SAN Dmao
UNIoN TRm., Jan. 27, 1993, at E8 (interviewing talent buyers afraid of
purchasing stylistic rights because they are uncertain of how the rights can be
legally used); Joanne Lipman, Sound-alike Ads Should Sound Alarm in Wake
of Court Ruling, WAL ST. J., Mar. 26, 1992, at B8 (expecting recent successful
suits to encourage more litigation); Bi-Rite Enters., Inc. v. Bruce Miner Poster
Co., Inc., 616 F. Supp. 71, 76 (D. Mass. 1984) (noting that the ephemeral
nature of stardom may make a person's right of publicity commercially
valuable for only a short period of time).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/7
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state. Part II explains that the value of stylistic rights has been
undermined by expanding the scope of these rights so broadly
that it is difficult to determine the ownership of these rights.
Part III recommends that courts place limits on the scope of
protection of stylistic rights and that buyers and sellers rely
instead on contract warranties to protect their rights. Specifi-
cally, this Note favors maintaining the distinctions between the
various theories protecting stylistic rights and limiting the right
of publicity to cover only the identifying characteristics a person
actually possesses. This proposal would force stylistic rights to
depend on self-limiting theories, making protected aspects of
style easier to identify and transfer.
I. THE PROTECTION OF AN INDIVIDUAL's RIGHT TO THE
COMMERCIAL USE OF IDENTITY
A. Early Protection for Stylistic Rights
Historically, courts protected an individual's identifying style
under the doctrines of copyright, trademark, unfair competition,
and the right of publicity. 9 Each doctrine shares the common
goal of preventing unjust enrichment of one who appropriates
the distinctive style or identity of another.10 Recognizing, how-
ever, that the purpose served by each doctrine is separate and
distinct, early courts hesitated to assume that all of the doctrines
applied simultaneously."
The right of publicity, for example, developed as an extension
of an individual's right to privacy.' 2 As such, the right of
9. See Helfand, supra note 3, at 632-41 (discussing traditional application
of the doctrines).
10. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573
(1977) (noting that the right of publicity and copyright have a common goal
of preventing unjust enrichment); Helfand, supra note 3, at 638 (observing
that § 43(a) of the Lanham Act essentially codified unfair competition laws
in an effort to prevent the unjust enrichment of people who would profit
from consumer confusion).
11. See, e.g., Helfand, supra note 3, at 639 (describing the elements a
plaintiff claiming copyright infringement had to prove).
12. Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis laid the foundation for the pro-
tection of an individual's identity in their famous article, The Right to Privacy.
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HA v. L.
REv. 193 (1890). For a thorough discussion of the evolution of the right of
publicity and the impact of the Warren and Brandeis article on its development,
see, e.g., William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 389 (1960).
Prosser argues that the right of privacy included: (1) intrusion upon one's
seclusion or solitude; (2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts; (3)
publicity which places one in a false light; and (4) appropriation of one's
name or likeness for the defendant's advantage. This fourth aspect of the
1995]
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publicity allows individuals to control the commercial use of
their identities. 3 In applying this right, early courts typically
limited protection to a person's "name, portrait or picture.' ' 4
right to privacy is known as the right of publicity because it is less concerned
with keeping private facts private as it is with making sure that individuals
control the commercial use of their identities. Id. at 389. See also Carson v.
Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 838 (6th Cir. 1983)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (explaining that there are three policy rationales
behind the right of publicity: (1) vindicating celebrities' economic interests,
(2) providing a financial incentive for others to produce intellectual and creative
works, and (3) preventing unjust enrichment and deceptive trade practices).
13. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573 (noting that the difference between the
right of privacy and the right of publicity is that the right of privacy seeks
to "minimize publication of ... damaging matter, while in 'right of publicity'
cases the only question is who gets to do the publishing"). The right of
publicity has been characterized in a variety of ways. See, e.g., Douglass v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1138 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The right [of
publicity] ... prevent[s] others from using one's name or picture for com-
mercial's purpose without consent."), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1094 (1986);
RESTATEMENT (THRmD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 46-49 (Preliminary Draft
No. 6, 1992) (explaining that liability should be established for "[o]ne who
misappropriates the commercial value of another's identity by using without
consent and for purposes of trade the other's name, likeness, or other indicia
of identity"); McCarthy, supra note 1, at vii (defining the right of publicity
as "the inherent right of every human being to control the commercial use of
his or her identity"); Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAv &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 216 (1954) ("[Ihe right of publicity [is] the right of
each person to control and profit from the publicity values which he has
created or purchased.").
14. See Leonard A. Wohl, Note, The Right of Publicity and Vocal Larceny:
Sounding Off on Sound-Alikes, 57 FoRDAm L. Rnv. 445, 448-50 (1988)
(differentiating between the traditional view of the right of publicity being
limited to name or likeness, and the more recent view which protects "the
persona in toto").
One of the first cases dealing with this issue was Roberson v. Rochester
Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902). In 1902, Roberson sued the
defendant for placing her picture on a box of flour without her consent. Id.
at 442. The New York Court of Appeals ruled against her, finding no precedent
to support her claim. Id. at 447-48. In response to public protest, the New
York legislature passed a statute preventing the use of a person's "name,
portrait or picture" for commercial purposes without the person's consent.
See Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 295 N.Y.S. 382, 384-85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1937)
(explaining that New York's privacy statute was passed after public outcry
over the Roberson decision).
The New York privacy statute is still in force. See N.Y. Civ. Rights Law
§§ 50-51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1989) ("Any person whose name, portrait
or picture is used within this state for advertising purposes or for the purposes
of trade without the written consent first obtained ... may ... restrain the
use thereof; and may also sue and recover damages for any injuries sustained
by reason of such use."). Although other courts found a common law right
to protect plaintiffs in similar cases, they construed the right narrowly. See,
e.g., LEahiri, 295 N.Y.S. at 389 (recognizing a limited common law right of
publicity). As a result of these decisions, a person's identity was protectedhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/7
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The reasoning behind the rule was that appropriation of a
person's name, portrait, or picture for commercial use violated
the individual's privacy "right to be let alone". 5 Thus, tradi-
tional intellectual property law principles would prohibit an
advertiser from using person A's picture without her consent,
but would not prohibit the advertiser from using a picture of
person B, who resembled person A.
Unfair competition laws also traditionally protected an indi-
vidual's identifying style. 16 The traditional test for infringement
under the doctrine of unfair competition was whether the "look
and feel" of the defendant's work caused the public to confuse
his work with that of the plaintiff. 7 Early courts extended the
doctrine of unfair competition to protect against appropriation
of a celebrity's identifying style.'" One reason for applying unfair
competition to protect a celebrity's unique style was to avoid
confusing the public. 9 Traditionally, therefore, a plaintiff who
did not have a right of publicity action against a defendant for
using the picture of a look-alike in a commercial could have a
viable claim under the doctrine of unfair competition. 20
against appropriation through the use of a person's name or face. See Wohl,
supra note 14, at 450 (explaining the limited nature of the early protection
for the right of publicity). Other attributes which could identify someone,
such as voice or distinctive dress, remained unprotected.
15. See Warren and Brandeis, supra note 12, at 193 (describing an indi-
vidual's "right to be let alone" as a component of the right of privacy).
16. The goals of unfair competition are to identify the source of goods,
to distinguish these goods from others on the market, to identify that the
goods are of equal value, and to assist in advertising. See I J. THOMAS
McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITON § 1:03 (3d ed. 1992 &
Supp. 1994). A person's identity does not have to be invoked to receive
protection from unfair competition laws. Similarities that cause confusion
regarding the source of goods may violate unfair competition laws, even
though the similarities are not specific enough to identify another person.
17. See, e.g., Chaplin v. Amador, 269 P. 544 (Cal. Ct. App. 1928). In
Chaplin, the California Court of Appeals protected an actor's style and
mannerisms with unfair competition law. Charles Amador appeared in movies
under the name "Charles Aplin" and imitated Charlie Chaplin's famous
character. Id. at 544-45. Chaplin sued and received an injunction preventing
Amador from making films that imitated Chaplin's movies, style of dress,
costume, or mannerisms. Id. at 545. The court explained that Chaplin's
character enjoyed such immense fame that his identity was invoked by the
character, even without reference to Chaplin by name. Id. at 546. The court
reasoned that Amador would deceive the public into believing Chaplin was
the actor in the movie. Id.
18. Chaplin, 269 P. at 546. The Chaplin court expanded the protection of
style by prohibiting not only appropriation of another person's picture, but
also imitation of a person's likeness.
19. Id.
20. Early efforts to protect style, such as the New York privacy statute,
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Trademark law, codified by the Lanham Act, is the federal
counterpart to state unfair competition laws.2' The same "look
and feel" test used in unfair competition cases applies in trade-
mark cases. The Lanham Act, however, provides uniform min-
imum protection for trademarks. 22 To the extent they are not
abandoned by their creators, 23 trademarks are protected under
the "look and feel" test against dilution by other market par-
ticipants. 24 Trademark and unfair competition laws, therefore,
traditionally focused on protecting an individual's identifying
style rather than protecting an individual's identity itself. 2
Copyright laws traditionally had an even narrower scope than
the foregoing doctrines. 26 Copyright law gives the owner of
only prevented the use of a person's actual attributes. Chaplin won his suit,
even though the impostor modified his own appearance and did not use
Chaplin's actual appearance.
21. Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988). See also Helfand,
supra note 3, at 638 (noting that the Lanham Act codifies most of the unfair
competition laws on the federal level); Goldstein, supra note 1, at 91 (explaining
that the Lanham Act was initially interpreted narrowly, but it is now read
broadly enough to be virtually coextensive with state unfair competition laws).
22. See Marcia B. Paul, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, in PRACTICING
LAW INsTrrUTE, LITIGATING COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARK, AND UNFAIR ComrnIT-
TION CASES 1989, at 131, 149 ("[W]hile § 43(a) claims are frequently conjoined
with statutory patent, trademark, and copyright claims, it cannot be assumed
that every act of trademark, copyright or patent infringement is, ipso facto,
a violation of Section 43(a).").
23. See Helfand, supra note 3 at 637 (noting that trademark protection is
potentially perpetual provided the mark is not abandoned by its creator).
24. See, e.g., Fischer v. Star Co., 132 N.E. 133 (N.Y. 1921) (relying on
trademark dilution theory to support a holding of trademark infringement),
cert. denied, 257 U.S. 654 (1921). In Fischer, the New York Court of Appeals
recognized that trademark law could provide protection for stylistic rights
which had acquired a secondary meaning. Id. at 138. Fischer was a cartoonist
who had created and registered a trademark on his cartoon characters, "Mutt
'n' Jeff." Id. at 136. Fischer later developed the characters into a syndicated
cartoon strip for the Star Company. Id. When Fischer changed syndicators,
the Star Company hired artists to continue the strip with the same title,
characters and names. Id. The court determined that the Star Company
infringed Fischer's trademark because the public associated the characters with
their original artist. The court relied on a trademark dilution theory to enjoin
the Star Company from publishing the strip. The court believed the Star
Company's continued use of the strip could result in the public tiring of
"Mutt 'n' Jeff" cartoons and that this would be an unfair appropriation of
the skill and celebrity Fischer had acquired. Id. at 138.
The purpose of state trademark dilution laws is to prevent the trademark
from losing its unique status in the marketplace, regardless of whether the
trademark is passed off as belonging to the imitator or not.
25. Compare Fischer, 132 N.E. 132 (relying on the impact on the public
of two producers of indistinguishable work to find infringement of style) with
RESTATEMENT (THiRD), supra note 13 (defining the purpose of a right of
publicity as protection against appropriation of one's identity).
26. See Helfand, supra note 3, at 629 (explaining that copyright protectionhttps://openscholarship.wustl.ed /law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/7
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original and expressive work a temporary monopoly on his or
her novel ideas. 27 Traditionally, however, courts did not extend
copyright protection to an individual's identifying style unless
the copying was very precise.3 Thus, in Nichols v. Universal
Pictures Corp.,2 Judge Learned Hand recognized that an artist's
style, as embodied in characters in a story line, was protected
by copyright.3 0 Judge Hand suggested that if Shakespeare's
Twelfth Night was copyrighted, the characters of Sir Toby Belch
or Malvolio would be protected, but the portrayal of a "riotous
knight" or a "foppish steward who becomes amorous of his
mistress" would not.'
is more limited because it only protects aspects of a work that are unique and
expressive). See also Copyright Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075
(1909) (repealed 1976).
27. The Copyright Act of 1909 gave copyright protection to works for 28
years after their creation and allowed the copyright to be renewed for another
28 years. See 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1976) (explaining this aspect of the previous
copyright Act) (repealed by 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1988)). After that, the copyright
would fall back into the public domain. See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 7-8.
The modem copyright Act extends copyright protection for the life of the
creator plus 50 years. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1988). This modification is much
easier to apply because all of a creator's work enters the public domain at
the same time, so difficult determinations of when a work was created can
be avoided. See, e.g., Philip E. Page, The Works: Distinguishing Derivative
Creations Under Copyright, 5 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 415, 430 (1986)
(explaining that all works enter the public domain simultaneously).
28. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988) (explaining what is known as the idea-
expression dichotomy by declaring "[iun no case does copyright protection
•.. extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work"). Basic plot premises,
described as scenes a faire, are not protected because they lack the originality
copyright law requires. See, e.g., Anderson v. Stallone, 1989 WL 206431, at
*13 (C.D. Cal. April 25, 1989) (refusing to consider the similarity between
movie ideas containing fight scenes because fight scenes are "scenes a faire"
in all boxing movies). Essentially, copyright protects expression, but not ideas.
For further discussion of copyright law and the idea-expression dichotomy,
see Amy B. Cohn, Copyright Law and the Myth of Objectivity: The Idea-
Expression Dichotomy and the Inevitability of Artistic Value Judgments, 66
IND. L.J. 175, 196-220 (1990) (explaining the origins of the idea/expression
dichotomy); Edward Samuels, The Idea-Expression Dichotomy in Copyright
Law, 56 TENN. L. REv. 321 (1989) (explaining the idea/expression dichotomy
thoroughly). See also Michelle Brownlee, Note, Safeguarding Style: What
Protection is Afforded to Visual Artists by the Copyright and Trademark
Laws?, 93 CoLJum. L. REv. 1157 (1993) (arguing that in many areas, particularly
the visual arts, it is difficult to separate "idea" from "expression" and noting
that this confusion makes it difficult to know how much "style" can be
appropriated before it becomes copyright infringement).
29. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
30. Id. at 121.
31. Id.
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Early courts carefully distinguished the doctrines of the right
of publicity, unfair competition, trademark, and copyright.32
Consequently, courts applied a particular doctrine only when its
independent objective was furthered by protecting an individual's
identifying style. In particular, the right of publicity was invoked
only when an individual's identity itself was appropriated for
commercial use.33 Early courts' restrictive appliction of these
intellectual property doctrines, however, left some areas of in-
dividual style unprotected.
B. The Expansion of the Right of Distinctive Style
Current intellectual property law has expanded the scope of
protected style by further developing the right of publicity and
by converging the doctrines of copyright, unfair competition,
and trademark. This expansion began as an attempt to fill gaps
in the protection of stylistic rights under traditional intellectual
property law. 34 Consequently, courts expanded stylistic rights by
broadening the scope of protected identifying characteristics to
include other distinguishing attributes such as voice and ap-
pearance. Courts further expanded protected style by moving
away from the traditional practice of applying a particular theory
only if the objective of that theory could be furthered by
protecting an individual's distinctive style. Now, however, this
expansion threatens to protect elements of style that are neither
distinctive nor identifying.
1. The Protection of Appearance
Courts have different theories for protecting an individual's
right to the commercial use of his or her appearance. For
example the Superior Court of New York, in Onassis v. Christian
Dior - N.Y., Inc.," broadly interpreted a New York privacy
statute "to protect the essence of the person.' '36 In Onassis,
32. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
33. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
34. There are many aspects of a person's identity which were not protected
by the traditional doctrines protecting style. Recent cases recognize that people
can be identified by other characteristics. See, e.g., Lahr v. Adell Chemical
Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962) (protecting Lahr's distinctive voice); Ali v.
Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (protecting Ali's appearance
from drawings of his likeness); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277,
1279-83 (D. Minn. 1970) (protecting identification of baseball players by their
names and playing statistics).
35. 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
36. Onassis, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 263. See also Allen v. National Video, 610
F. Supp. 612, 627-30 (protecting plaintiff's identity under the Lanham Act
and rejecting protection under the right of publicity).https://op ns holarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/7
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Jacqueline Kennedy-Onassis sued Christian Dior for using an
Onassis look-alike in a commercial featuring other famous ce-
lebrities.3 7 The court interpreted the word "portrait" in the New
York privacy statute to include a picture of another person
designed to "convey the idea that it was the plaintiff."38 Despite
the limited language of the statute, the court concluded that
Onassis' "portrait" had been appropriated because the look-
alike was a good impostor and the presence of other celebrities
would foster a belief that Onassis actually appeared in the
commercial .39
The New York District Court in Allen v. National Video,
Inc.,40 on the other hand, relied on trademark law to protect
Woody Allen's appearance. 41 National Video hired a look-alike
holding a V.I.P. card and renting Woody Allen videos to appear
in a commercial.4 2 The defendants conceded that they intention-
ally sought a look-alike of Allen for the commercial, but they
denied any intention to pass the look-alike off as Woody Allen. 43
The court concluded that even if the look-alike was not intended
to look like Woody Allen, many people would believe that it
was him. 44 This decision broadens protection for appearance
beyond Onassis to include even poor impostors.45 As long as
the impostor causes confusion regarding another person's iden-
tity, there may be a violation of the Lanham Act,46 whether or
37. Onassis. 472 N.Y.S.2d at 256.
38. Id. at 261.
39. Id. at 262.
40. 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
41. Id. at 628-31.
42. Id. at 617-18. National Video was marketing a V.I.P. card that
"apparently entitled the bearer to favorable terms on movie rentals." Id. at
618. The caption to the advertisement read "Become a V.I.P. at National
Video. We'll make you feel like a star." Id.
43. Id. The defendants claimed the commercial depicted a fan of Woody
Allen who adopted Allen's appearance and went to National Video to receive
star treatment. Id.
44. Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 628 ("[A]t a cursory glance, many consumers,
even sophisticated ones, are likely to be confused."). Woody Allen's associ-
ation with movies strengthened the court's impression that the public would
construe the commercial as an endorsement by Allen. Id.
45. The court concluded that the impostor interfered with Allen's rights
under the Lanham Act, even though the impostor did not look enough like
Allen for the public to be certain that it was him. Id. at 624, 628. The
Lanham Act provided more expansive protection for Allen than was available
to Onassis under the New York privacy statute. The Onassis court required
the imitation of a person's likeness to serve as a substitute for a photograph.
Onassis, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 259.
46. Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 627 ("This inquiry requires the court to consider
whether the look-alike employed is sufficiently similar to plaintiff to create
such a likelihood - an inquiry much like that made in similar, but not
identical, trademarks.").
19951
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not the look-alike's picture is good enough to constitute the
celebrity's "portrait" under a privacy statute.47
The protection given to a person's appearance has even been
extended to inexact drawings of a person. In Ali v. Playgirl,
Inc.,4s the court issued a preliminary injunction under the New
York privacy statute to prevent Playgirl from using an illustra-
tion of Muhammad Ali. 49 The illustration was done in a style
described as "somewhere between representational art and car-
toon."50 The picture depicted a nude black man sitting on a
stool in the corner of a boxing ring with his hands taped and
outstretched on the ropes at his side.' The man in the picture
was not identified by name,52 but the caption described him as
a "Mystery Man" and as "the Greatest. ' 53 The resemblance of
the character's features to Ai, combined with his presence in a
boxing ring and the reference to his nick-name, "the Greatest,"
convinced the court that the man in the picture invoked Ali's
identity.54
The courts in Onassis,5 Allen,5 6 and especially Ali57 relied on
only marginally identifying factors to find infringement. None
47. Id. at 625 (rejecting plaintiff's argument that his "privacy" rights were
violated). See also Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1110-11 (9th Cir.
1992) (as amended on denial of rehearing and rehearing en banc) (finding
infringement of the right of publicity and the Lanham Act, but striking the
damages under the Lanham Act because they are duplicative), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1047 (1993). There is little practical difference from prevailing
under either a trademark or invasion of privacy theory. There may be a
difference between whether a violation is classified as dealing with the right
of publicity or unfair competition. The right of publicity is alienable in some
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Haelan Lab. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d
866, 869 (2d Cir.) (designating the right as assignable), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
816 (1953); Bi-Rite Enters., Inc. v. Bruce Miner Poster Co., 616 F. Supp. 71,
73 (D. Mass. 1984) (finding the right assignable). See also Martin Luther King,
Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods., Inc., 296
S.E.2d 697, 705 (1982) (holding the right descendible); CAL. CrV. CODE § 990
(West Supp. 1994) (creating an inheritable right of publicity); FLA. STAT. ANN.
9 540.08(1)(c) (West 1988) (creating an inheritable right of publicity); NEB.
REv. STAT. §§ 20-202, 207 to 208 (1987) (creating an inheritable right of
"privacy"). Trademark and unfair competition laws may not extend this far.
See Pesce, supra note 2, at 784.
48. 447 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
49. Id. at 730.
50. Id. at 727.
51. Id. at 726.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 727.
54. Id. at 726-27.
55. Onassis, 472 N.Y.S.2d. at 257 (considering the presence of the other
celebrities in the commercial to reinforce the idea that Jacqueline Onassis was
actually present).
56. Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 617-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (concluding the movieshttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/7
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of the courts claimed that infringement was determined solely
by comparing the plaintiff's physical characteristics to the im-
postor's. Instead, each court considered additional factors, like
the presence of other celebrities, 58 the movies being rented 59 and
the presence of a boxing ring, 6° to support the plaintiffs' asser-
tions that their images were invoked.
The weight these peripheral factors should be given is difficult
to determine.6' Cases like Ali are difficult because the numerous
similarities are only marginally identifying. 62 After Ali, the test
for determining whether a person's right of publicity has been
violated appears to be whether through an accumulation of
several factors that are only marginally identifying, little doubt
is left as to who the picture represents. 63
1
being rented and the excited reaction of the woman behind the counter in the
commercial implied that Allen was present).
57. All, 447 F. Supp. at 725-27 (relying solely on marginal characteristics
to identify the man in the picture as Ali, such as his smile, the caption "the
Greatest," the presence of the boxing ring, and that the figure was a black
male).
58. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text (discussing the factors
used by the Onassis court).
59. See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text (describing how the Allen
court relied on the circumstances in which the imitator appeared).
60. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
61. A person may be identified by marginal characteristics if enough of
those characteristics are used to conjure up that person's image. See, e.g.,
Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 758 (9th Cir. 1978) (discussing
copying for purpose of parody), cert. denied, sub nom., O'Neil v. Walt Disney
Prods., 439 U.S. 1132 (1979). It is difficult to decide how much similarity is
enough to identify a person. Courts should be careful to balance individual
rights against the public interest in a broad public domain. See supra note 5
(discussing traditional balancing in intellectual property law under copyright
and trademark). See also Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-
Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual
Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993) (arguing that copyright strikes a balance
between the rights of the individual and the general public).
Courts will also have to consider what weight, if any, should be given to
factors that do not conform to a person's image. For example, the Ali court
considered factors present in the drawing that would strengthen the public's
association between Ali and the man in the picture. Ali, 447 F. Supp. at 726-
27. The court did not consider factors that were inconsistent with Ali's image.
The public may associate Ali with a black man in a boxing ring, but they
have no reason to associate a nude black man in a boxing ring with Ai. The
court did not address this issue, so it is not clear if the court overlooked it
or deemed it irrelevant. Had the man in the picture been white or had long
blond hair, perhaps the result would have been different.
62. Compare Ali, 447 F. Supp. at 723 (finding infringement on Ali's right
of publicity when none of the characteristics in the defendant's drawing were
independently identifying) with Chaplin v. Amador, 269 P. 544 (Cal. Ct. App.
1928) (protecting Chaplin's right to use his character against an imposter who
copied his routine verbatim).
63. See Ali, 447 F. Supp. at 729.
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Trademark and unfair competition laws can provide even more
protection than the right of publicity in cases where the imitation
is not very accurate. 64 Trademark and unfair competition statutes
do not require the image to be exact, only close enough to cause
consuiner confusion. 65 Satisfying the other prerequisites for a
trademark or unfair competition claim is not usually very dif-
ficult." However, trademark and unfair competition laws will
not completely replace the need for the right of publicity. 6
Instances still occur when the right of publicity may be the only
source of relief, for example, when a celebrity's image is mis-
appropriated by a look-alike who can't possibly be the actual
celebrity. 68 In such cases, the right of publicity remains a sig-
nificant source of protection for celebrities.
2. The Protection of Voice
Voice is another identifying characteristic that intellectual
property laws protect. 69 Some states protect this right through
privacy statutes, 70 while other states rely on the common law.7'
64. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text (discussing why unfair
competition may provide more extensive protection than the right of publicity).
But cf. Nurmi v. Peterson, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1775 (C.D. Cal. 1989)
(refusing to conclude that Elvira's character infringed on the right of publicity
of her 1950's equivalent, Vampira, because unfair trade practices were not
proven).
65. See Nurmi, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1775.
66. See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1110 (9th Cir. 1992)
(as amended on denial of rehearing and rehearing en banc) (overcoming the
requirement that the defendant's commercial competed with Waits' ability to
market his identity, even though Waits refused to do commercials), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1047 (1993); Dallas Cowboy's Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat
Cinema, Ltd., 467 F. Supp. 366, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding that the
defendant's use of plaintiff's uniforms in pornographic movies violated the
plaintiff's trademark rights, even though plaintiff did not make pornographic
movies). But see Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988)
(rejecting Midler's claim that the defendant's use of Midler's voice violated
California's unfair competition law because Midler refused to do commercials),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1513 (1992).
67. Unfair competition law serves different purposes than the right of
publicity. See supra note 16 (discussing the goals of unfair competition law).
68. See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988)
(upholding the plaintiff's claim under the right of publicity, but rejecting her
claim of unfair competition), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1513 (1992).
69. See, e.g., Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962)
(recognizing for the first time that distinctive voices were protected by the
right of publicity).
70. See, e.g., CAL. 'Crv. CODE § 3344 (West Supp. 1995) (providing
protection for the use of a person's actual voice).
71. See, e.g., Midler, 849 F.2d at 463 (recognizing a common law right
of voice misappropriation when Midler's voice was copied by an impostor).
See also Donna Larcen, Going Commercial: Stars Lend Voice, but not Visage,https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/7
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The common law often provides more expansive protection than
privacy statutes.72 Both the common law and statutes, however,
recognize that the human voice is one of the most palpable
ways that identity is manifested.
In Midler v. Ford Motor Co.,73 the Ninth Circuit held that
the California privacy statute prevented misappropriating but
not imitating a person's voice.74 The court concluded, however,
that celebrity Bette Midler had a common law cause of action
against the defendant for the tort of voice misappropriation.
The elements of this tort are: (1) the intentional imitation of
(2) a distinctive and (3) well known voice (4) for commercial
purposes.75 The Midler court justified protecting distinctive voices
as a natural extension of the right of publicity.7 6 The court
noted, "A voice is as distinctive and personal as a face."'7 7 The
court felt it was particularly important to protect the use of
Midler's voice in this instance because the infringement involved
singing.78
The Ninth Circuit clarified the Midler requirement that the
imitated voice be "distinctive" in Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc.79 In
to T.V. Ads, HousToN CEXoN., Apr. 6, 1992, at 6 (explaining that the use
of celebrity voices is on the rise because advertisers realize that a familiar
voice captures the public's attention).
72. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463 (relying on the right of publicity to protect
Midler's voice against impersonation when the California statute would not).
73. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1513 (1992).
74. Id. at 463 (recognizing that the defendant misappropriated Midler's
voice). See also Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 1992)
(as amended on denial of rehearing and rehearing en banc) (describing the
tort of voice misappropriation described in Midler as a "species" of the "right
of publicity"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1047 (1993). See also Trust Co. Bank
v. Putnam Publishing, No. CV 87-07393 AHS (JRX), 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4963, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 1988) (concluding that the defendant's book
violated the copyright to Gone with the Wind because it was a read-alike).
75. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463 ("We hold only that when a ... singer is
widely known and is deliberately imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers
have appropriated what is not theirs and have committed a tort in Califor-
nia."). See also Neil L. Shapiro and Karl Olson, Encore Performances: "'Do
you Want to Sue?" Climbs the Charts, LEGAL Tnus, Jan. 15, 1990, at 27
(noting that it is ironic that under First Amendment principles Young &
Rubicam could have a singer perform an awful rendition of Midler's song as
a parody, probably doing more harm to Midler's image). This view is buttressed
by the recent Supreme Court holding that parody is a fair use under the
Copyright Act. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
76. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
77. Id.
78. Judge Noonan explained, "The singer manifests herself in the song.
To impersonate her voice is to pirate her identity." Id. at 463 (citing W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 852 (5th ed.
1984).
79. 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992) (as amended on denial of rehearing and
rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1047 (1993).
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Waits, singer Tom Waits sued Frito-Lay for hiring a sound-
alike to imitate his voice in a commercial.80 The court explained
that to be a distinctive imitation, an imitation must not merely
remind the public of the plaintiff,8 ' must also imitate an
artist's voice that is distinguishable from other singers. 2
It is important to maintain the distinction between identifying
characteristics and nonprotectable characteristics that are merely
associated with an individual.8 3 The courts are justified in pro-
tecting the aspects of an individual's style which set him or her
apart from all others, but they should be careful to leave enough
room for other artists to develop their own styles. 4 Unfortu-
nately, separating an individual's characteristics from a genre's
characteristics often proves difficult. Artistic work inherently
builds upon the work of others. 85 When a new art form begins,
it is difficult to distinguish the style of a particular artist from
the genre it could grow to become.86 Most people, for example,
80. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1097.
81. Id. at 1101.
82. Id. at 1101-02.
83. Cf. Gordon, supra note 61, at 1582-83. The goal of the right of
publicity to protect an individual's persona is furthered only by protecting
attributes that invoke a particular person's identity. Id. Protecting traits that
are merelj associated with an individual may provide some additional protec-
tion for that person's identity. Id. This benefit is insignificant because a
person's identity is not conclusively invoked by attributes that are merely
associated with them. Expanding the right of publicity to include marginally
identifying characteristics gives an individual the right to control the commer-
cial use of attributes held in common by other people. Id. Restricting the
scope of the public domain is unwarranted because the benefit to individual
rights is insignificant. See also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S.
Ct. 1164, 1170 (1994) (explaining that courts should avoid a "rigid application
of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity
which that law is designed to foster") (citing Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207,
236 (1990)); Gordon, supra note 61, at 1533 (arguing that copyright law is
designed to balance the rights between individuals and the public).
84. See Madow, supra note 5, at 239 (arguing that the right of publicity
should be restricted to preserve room for innovation in the public domain).
The scope of the public domain becomes uncertain when the right of publicity
is expanded to protect attributes that are merely associated with an individual.
The public's incentive to create would diminish because works the public
builds upon may be protected by someone else's right of publicity.
85. See Page, supra note 27, at 418. Page explains that, in a broad sense,
all works are derivative because they rely on previously existing elements. Page
notes that the distinction between works that share common elements and
works that are based on an earlier work may be difficult to determine. Id.
See also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1169 (1994)
(noting that all works "must necessarily borrow" from works of the past)
(quoting Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (No. 4,436) (CCD Mass.
1845)).
86. Determining the scope of an innovative artist's style is difficult whenhttps://openschola sh p.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/7
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can distinguish between the music of Elvis Presley and Buddy
Holly, but at one time all "rock 'n' roll" music probably
sounded like Elvis'. When faced with these innovative artist
cases, the courts should tailor the law to promote the individual's
interests, as well as those of society as a whole.
3. The Protection of Style in a Person's Creations
Copyright law protects a person's right to his or her creative
work for the life of the creator plus 50 years. 87 Literary works,
dramatic works, pictorial and graphic works, motion pictures,
and other audiovisual works fall within the scope of copyright
protection.8" A person's copyright is violated when the unique
and expressive portions of his or her work are "substantially"
copied.89 This protection extends to original works, as well as
works derived from the original2c9
a genre first emerges because the genre grows with the artist who discovered
it. The protected aspects of the artist's style should be narrowly construed to
encourage the public to explore the genre's outer limits. See Moore v. Columbia
Pictures Indus., Inc., 972 F.2d 939, 947 (8th Cir. 1992) (Lay, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part) (explaining that jurors should determine whether
musical compositions share a similarity of expression because judges have no
expertise in the area). The Supreme Court recently reminded us of Justice
Holmes' words that:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to
the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of [a
work], outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the
one extreme some works of genius would be sure to miss appre-
ciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the
public had learned the new language in which their author spoke.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1173 (1994) (quoting
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903)).
87. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1988). See also supra note 27 (describing the differ-
ences between the current copyright act and earlier copyright law).
88. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988). Section 102 states:
a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title,
in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression, now known or later developed, from which they can
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either di-
rectly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship
include the following categories:
(I) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
(7) sound recordings.
17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
89. This is the traditional test for determining copyright infringement. See,
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Copyright protects an individual's own unique style, it does
not protect a general artistic style. The District Court for the
Southern District of New York explained this distinction in
Jewelry 10, Inc. v. Elegance Trading Co.91 Jewelry 10 designed
porcelain jewelry using a style called pointillism92 and sued other
jewelry designers for copying this technique without their con-
sent.93 The court noted that some of the defendant's designs
"created a similar general effect or impression" as the plaintiff's
designs because they both used the pointillism technique. 94 The
designs that created this "similar general effect" did not, how-
ever, infringe on the plaintiff's copyright because the idea of
applying pointillism to porcelain jewelry was too general to
receive copyright protections. 95 The defendant violated the copy-
right to the plaintiff's "more distinctive designs" because these
designs were part of the artist's distinctive style, rather than his
or her genre. 96
The court that decided Jewelry 10 provided more extensive
protection to style in Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Industries,
Inc.,97 and gave more explicit protection to an artist's style. The
court explained that copyright law protects style only when the
style is distinctive.98 The plaintiff in Steinberg sued Columbia
Pictures, the producers of "Moscow on the Hudson," for
infringing on the style of his work. 99 The plaintiff had designed
a print that is "widely known as a parochial New Yorker's view
of the world."'' ° The picture gave its viewers a unique, birds-
eye view of the world. New York City was drawn in detail with
the rest of the world receiving only minimal attention. 10' The
court recognized this "sketchy, whimsical style" as "one of
Steinberg's hallmarks."' 0 2 The defendant's movie poster changed
much of the design, but retained Steinberg's distinctive style. 03
e.g., Moore v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 972 F.2d 939, 941-42 (8th Cir.
1992) (applying the "substantial similarity" test).
90. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b). See also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (defining a
"derivative work" as one that is based on one or more preexisting works
which has been modified in a manner that, as a whole, transforms the work
into an original work of authorship).
91. No. 88 Civ. 1320 (PNL), 1991 WL 144151 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 1991).
92. Id. at *1.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at *4.
96. Id. at *5.
97. 663 F. Supp. 706, 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
98. Id. at 711-12.
99. Id. at 708.
100. Id. at 709.
101. Id. at 710.
102. Id. at 712.
103. Id. at 713.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/7
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The stylistic similarities convinced the court that the defendant's
poster infringed on Steinberg's copyright. 1 4
Jewelry 10 and Steinberg represent the outer limits of protec-
tion for stylistic rights. 105 The plaintiffs in those cases essentially
argued that the defendants created a derivative of their work
rather than an exact copy. Proving infringement is much harder
when the defendant's work is derivative.'06 Plaintiffs alleging
that a defendant created a derivative work cannot show a
"substantial similarity" by pointing to direct copying. 0 7 Instead,
plaintiff's must establish the scope of their style entitled to
protection before they can prove infringement. 08 This additional
hurdle could prevent many would-be plaintiffs from suing to
protect their copyrights.
These obstacles cause plaintiffs to find trademark law an
attractive alternative to copyright when another person's work
is similar to their own, even though it is not a copy.1' 9 Specific
forms of artistic expression frequently develop a secondary
meaning, entitling them to trademark protection." 0 Mickey
104. Id. at 713-14, 716.
105. In these cases, the "substantial similarity" between the works infringed
the plaintiff's copyrights, even though the copying was not verbatim. See
supra notes 96 and 104 and accompanying text. When the copying is not
direct, however, a "substantial similarity" is more difficult to identify.
106. A substantial similarity between works is easier to identify when the
copying is direct, like a lithograph, because the similarities are very apparent.
When copying is done in a modified form, a substantial similarity is more
difficult to prove because the similarities are less obvious.
107. Derivative works by their nature are modified forms of the original.
A 'derivative work' is a work based upon one or more preexisting
works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization,
* condensation, or any other form in which a work may be
recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial
revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which,
as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a 'deriv-
ative work.'
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
108. The plaintiff must show that his copyright includes the distinctive
aspects of the defendant's work. Before this can be proved, the plaintiff must
establish that his overall style is distinctive enough to be subject to copyright
protection.
109. Trademark protection may be more appealing to plaintiffs than copy-
right law because trademark only requires the similarities between works to
be substantial enough to confuse consumers regarding the source of the goods.
Trademark does not require the public to be misled into believing that the
defendant's goods are the same as the plaintiff's, but only demands a strong
enough similarity to mislead the public into believing the goods came from
the same source. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text (discussing the
goal of trademark law).
110. See RESTATEMENT (rHIR13) OF UNrAIR COMPETITION § 13 (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 1990) (explaining that "secondary meaning" is acquired when
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Mouse, for example, is not only an art form, but also a
trademark for Disney.' Furthermore, it is even possible for an
artist's style to be distinctive enough to operate as a trademark.,
12
Keith Haring is an example of an artist with a style distinctive
enough to act as a signature."' Haring's work can be set apart
from other artists through his unique use of bubble-shaped
figures, bright colors, and a minimal amount of detail."
4
C. The Legal Theories Protecting Style Converge
Protection is often available for a person's style under several
different legal theories." 5 Although each theory is distinct, courts
recently have merged the tests for the theories, providing more
extensive protection for stylistic rights." 6 For example, the Ninth
Circuit has used the "look and feel" test of trademark law to
determine whether a "substantial similarity" exists under copy-
right law. 17 This approach broadens copyright protection by
allowing the trier of fact to consider more than the actual
similarities between works."' The "feel" element of the test
something, which is not inherently identifying, is used by a particular person
so frequently that the public recognizes its use as "uniquely associated with
[a particular] person's goods, services or business"); McCarthy, supra note 1,
at § 15:2 ("The prime element of secondary meaning is a mental association
in buyers' minds between the alleged mark and a single source of the product.
It is the crucial word 'association' which appears most often in judicial
observations on secondary meaning."). See also Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's
B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 843-44 (9th Cir. 1987) (explaining that
secondary meaning is not required when a mark is inherently distinctive).
111. See Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 759 (9th
Cir. 1978) (recognizing that the Disney characters operate as a trademark for
Walt Disney Productions), cert. denied, sub nom., O'Neil v. Walt Disney
Prods., 439 U.S. 1132 (1979).
112. See Jewelry 10, 1991 WL 14451 and Steinberg, 663 F. Supp. 706
(protecting individuals' distinctive artistic styles).
113. Keith Haring was a graffiti artist whose unique characters propelled
him to fame in the pop art community. Haring died of AIDS in 1990. Paul
Richard, Keith Haring Amid the Pop Icons, WAsH. PosT, June 6, 1992, at
Cl.
114. See Brownlee, supra note 28, at 1179 (arguing that Keith Haring's
style may be distinctive enough to be entitled to copyright expression).
115. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (explaining that the various
intellectual property doctrines protecting style frequently overlap).
116. See infra notes 120-42 (discussing cases combining the intellectual
property law doctrines to provide more expansive protection for stylistic rights).
117. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions v. McDonald's Corp.,
562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977). See also Helfand, supra note 3, at 643-52
(detailing the convergence of copyright and trademark in the Ninth Circuit).
118. See Helfand, supra note 3, at 643-51 (observing that the convergence
of these tests allows courts to find copyright infringement by considering
subjective factors, in addition to the objective factors traditionally relied upon
in copyright cases).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/7
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introduces subjective factors into determining whether a copy-
right has been infringed. 119
1. Initial Blending of the Intellectual Property Doctrines
The Ninth Circuit first applied the "look and feel" test to a
copyright action in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions
v. McDonald's Corp. 20 The plaintiff in McDonald's argued that
the defendant's McDonaldland characters infringed the charac-
ters of the H.R. Pufnstuf television program .' 2  The Ninth
Circuit concluded that McDonald's infringed the plaintiff's copy-
right because the McDonaldland characters possessed the sub-
jective qualities of the plaintiff's characters, even though the
court did not find any objective similarities. 22
Trademark law has also been altered by copyright law. In
Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. Manns Theaters,123 the District
Court for the Central District of California applied copyright
standards to determine a trademark violation. 24 In that case,
the plaintiff claimed the defendant infringed on their trademark
in "Tarzan"' 125 by producing an X-rated film called "Tarz &
Jane & Boy & Cheeta."' 1 The court concluded that the defen-
dant violated the trademark even absent any proof of confusion
regarding the source of the film.127 The court based its decision
that "Tarz" infringed on the trademark to "Tarzan" on the
copyright standard of "substantial similarity," rather than the
traditional trademark test of confusion regarding the source of
goods. '2
The court in Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. blended copyright
and trademark law even further by declaring that the names
"Tarzan," "Jane," "Boy," and "Cheeta" were the exclusive
property of the plaintiff for the life of its copyright. 29 This
119. Id. (noting that the "feel" aspect of the trademark test is a subjective
inquiry because it seeks to determine whether the public is reminded of someone
other than the work's creator).
120. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
121. Id. at 1169.
122. Id. at 1162-63.
123. 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 159 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
124. Id. at 162.
125. Id. See also Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. High Society Magazine,
Inc., 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1862 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (challenging a pornographic
magazine for publishing a raunchy escapade by Tarzan).




129. See Helfand, supra note 3, at 646 (arguing that the plaintiff was given
trademark protection for the life of the copyright).
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hybrid legal theory gave the plaintiff's trademark in these names
absolute protection. 13 0 Extending the protection of the names
for the life of the copyright prevents the plaintiff from losing
the trademark on the names through abandonment, a traditional
defense to trademark infringement.'31 In other words, under the
Edgar Rice Burroughs analysis, the plaintiff will not lose the
right to the names until the copyright runs out, even if the
public ceases to associate the names with the plaintiff. 3 2 Addi-
tionally, the fair use exception to copyright does not apply
because the names are still trademarks.'
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
created another hybrid, described as "copyright-dilution,' 3 4 in
DC Comics Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Business.'35 The court
denied the defendant's copyright infringement defense of fair
use because the defendant's use of the plaintiff's characters
would harm the character's all-American images. 36 The court
did not fear that the defendant's work would actually compete
with the plaintiff's. 37 Instead, the court feared that the defen-
dant's satirical use of "Superman" and "Wonder Woman"
would damage the characters' positive public image.'38 However,
protection of the image of a trademark is the goal of state anti-
dilution statutes, not copyright. 3 9 The court in DC Comics
130. Id. (explaining that the protection given to these characters avoids the
traditional defenses to copyright and trademark because of the way that the
court combined the doctrines).
131. Id. at 647.
132. See Helfand, supra note 3, at 644-46 (stating that the trademark defense
of abandonment would not give the public access to the characters because
they are entitled to' copyright protection).
133. Id. (noting that the fair use exception, traditionally available as a
defense against a claim of copyright infringement, did not apply to the
characters because they were entitled to trademark protection).
134. Traditionally, secondary dilution was a focus of state trademark law.
See supra note 24 (discussing the role of state trademark dilution laws).
135. 598 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
136. Id. at 118.
137. See Helfand, supra note 3, at 648 (noting that the court never ques-
tioned whether any harm would be inflicted upon the plaintiff from compe-
tition).
138. D.C. Comics, 598 F. Supp. at 118 (noting that the defendant tarnished
the "all-American" image that the plaintiff labored to create).
139. See Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1016 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (using the plaintiff's character in an adult-oriented satire
constituted a fair use under copyright law, but nevertheless violated the state
anti-dilution statute); Jerome Gilson, Highlights of the Trademark Law Re-
vision Act of 1988, in 3 TRAnmARuK PROTECTION & PRACTICE at COMM-5
(1989) (noting that about twenty states have passed anti-dilution statutes);
Chemical Corp. of America v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433 (5th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 965 (1963) (concluding the insecticide maker'shttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/7
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divorced the goals of the theories protecting style from their
applications by haphazardly combining the distinct elements of
those theories.140 The "copyright-dilution" theory was unneces-
sary because the case could have been decided using either
copyright or trademark law.' 41 Although the scope of this new
doctrine remains undefined, it is a source that allows future
courts to further intrude into the public domain.
2. The Extreme Cases Protecting Style
Several recent cases have extended the right of publicity to
aspects of style which are not unique to a particular individual.
These cases protect style associated with a person even though
it is not a strong enough indicator to identify the person. Earlier
right of publicity cases sought to protect only a person's iden-
tity. 42 These recent cases infuse trademark standards for deter-
mining infringement into the right of publicity. 43 This
combination renders infringement an easier standard for plain-
tiffs to prove because the similarities do not have to relate to
an identifying characteristic.'" Further, trademark's requirement
of consumer confusion does not apply. 45 Instead, infringement
slogan "Where there's life, there's bugs," harmed the defendants slogan
"Where there's life, there's Bud"); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v.
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (merchandising
Garbage Pail Kids injured the Cabbage Patch kids' mark); DC Comics, Inc.
v. Unlimited Monkey Business, 598 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (holding
that the trademarks to Superman and Wonder Woman were damaged by a
singing telegram business); General Elec. Co. v. Alumpa Coal Co., Inc., 205
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1036 (D. Mass. 1979) (deciding the "Genital Electric" logo
damaged the plaintiff's trademark); Gucci Shops, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co.,
Inc., 446 F. Supp. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (labeling diaper bag "Gucchi Goo"
injured the plaintiff's trademark); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346
F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (enjoining posters bearing the "Enjoy Cocaine"
logo because of its similarity to the Coca-Cola logo).
140. The trademark goal of preventing confusion is not furthered by pre-
venting a trademark from being diluted.
141. DC Comics, 598 F. Supp. at 118 (noting that an antidilution statute
was available in that jurisdiction). See also Helfand, supra note 3, at 649
(observing that the creation of "copyright-dilution" was not necessary because
other remedies were available).
142. See supra note 13 (describing the traditional application of right of
publicity to protect an individual's identity).
143. See infra notes 147-97 and accompanying text. The cases described
infra recognize a right of publicity when the defendant's activities remind the
public of the plaintiff. This confusion standard is traditionally associated with
trademark law, rather than the right of publicity. See supra note 22 and
accompanying text (explaining that the goal of trademark law is to prevent
confusion regarding the source of goods) and supra note 12 and accompanying
text (emphasizing that the goal of the right of publicity is to protect an
individual's identity by preventing the misappropriation of identifying char-
acteristics).
144. All identifying characteristics remind the public of the person who
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is determined solely by whether the defendant's actions remind
the public of the plaintiff. 46
Courts that expand the right of publicity to include marginally
identifying characteristics often rely on Motschenbacher v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. 147 The Ninth Circuit in Motschenbacher
held that the defendant's commercial featuring a race car resem-
bling the plaintiff's violated the plaintiff's right of publicity. 48
The advertisement did not refer to Motschenbacher by name or
use his photograph. 49 The Motschenbacher court nevertheless
reasoned that the car in the commercial identified Motschen-
bacher. The car had distinctive markings that identified Mot-
schenbacher even though the defendant had changed many of
the marks on Motschenbacher's car. 50 The court's decision was
premised on the unlikely assumption that Motschenbacher was
identifiable in the commercial.' Cases following Motschen-
possesses the characteristics, but not all characteristics that remind people of
a particular person are strong enough indicators of a person's attributes to
definitively say that they invoke a person's identity. For example, describing
a man as "the actor who plays a private detective on t.v." may remind people
of Tom Selleck's character on Magnum P.L, but this description is not
identifying because this description is true of many other actors who play
private investigators, including Robert Blake (Barretta), David Soul (Starsky
and Hutch), and Bruce Willis (Moonlighting).
145. The merger of trademark law into the right of publicity did not include
trademark's requirement that actual confusion result to prove infringement.
Under the hybrid, infringement can be determined by showing that the
characteristic the defendant invokes is associated with the plaintiff.
146. See Scott M. Martin & Peter W. Smith, The Unconstitutionality of
State Motion Picture Film Lien Laws (or How Spike Lee Almost Lost It), 39
Am. U. L. REv. 59 (1989) (explaining and criticizing state laws that interfere
with copyright laws); Karen M. Corr, Comment, Protection of Art Work
Through Artists' Rights: An Analysis of State Law and Proposal for Change,
38 AM. U. L. REv. 855 (1989) (explaining that state laws which may interfere
with federal copyright law may be preempted).
147. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974). See also Penelope McMillan, The Scales
of Justice Often Weigh Some Very Odd Things, Los ANGLEs TIMEs, Sept. 20,
1993, at B1 (providing the details of Peyton v. Health Devices, Inc.). Peyton
was a very strange case involving the misappropriation of a person's likeness.
Id. The case involved a porn star who claimed his identity was misappropriated
by the defendant's use of a mold of his penis. Id. The plaintiff was paid
$200,000 to have a mold of his penis made for development of sexual devices.
Id. The plaintiff sued when the mold was recast to make additional sexual
devices. The Los Angeles Superior Court dismissed the case. Id.
148. Motschenbacher, 498 F.2d at 826-27.
149. Id. at 822.
150. Id. at 827. For example, the defendant added a spoiler with the "Shell"
logo that Motschenbacher did not normally have on his car. Id.
151. It seems unlikely that Motschenbacher's race car was distinct enough
from other race cars or sufficiently associated with him by the public for the
car to be an identifying characteristic, The court, however, concluded that the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/7
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bacher have apparently viewed the tenuous connection between
the car and its driver as giving the green light to expanding
protection for aspects of a person's style to those aspects which
are merely associated with the person.
As an example, the court in Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane &
Bernbach5 2 relied on Motschenbacher to expand the right of
publicity. In Lombardo, the defendant produced a commercial
portraying a New Year's Eve party complete with balloons,
party hats, and a band playing Auld Lang Syne.15 1 Guy Lom-
bardo sued claiming the commercial infringed on his identity.
The defendant had not used Lombardo's name, nick-name, or
even a person resembling him in the commercial. 54 In denying
the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court con-
cluded that the similarity between the performances gave Lom-
bardo a cause of action because people could be deceived into
believing that he was in the commercial.155
Lombardo is a gross extension of Motschenbacher.56 There
was no basis for the Lombardo court to deny the defendant's
motion for summary judgement because the actor in the com-
mercial did not physically resemble the plaintiff. 57 A right of
publicity cause of action on these facts essentially gave Lom-
bardo a monopoly on the commercial use of the traditional New
Year's Eve party.'58 The court relied upon a New Year's Eve
party with balloons, party hats, and a band playing Auld Lang
Syne to determine that Lombardo could have an infringement
claim against the defendant. 5 9 These aspects are common to
car was a distinctive attribute that invoked Motschenbacher's identity. Id. at
826-27.
152. 58 A.D.2d 620 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977).
153. Guy Lombardo had conducted a band at similar New Year's Eve
parties for more than forty years and was known as "Mr. New Year's Eve."
Lombardo, 58 A.D.2d at 622.
154. Id. at 623 (Titone and Suozzi, JJ., concurring and dissenting in part)
(noting that "the plaintiff's name was never mentioned in the commercial"
and that the man in the commercial "did not physically resemble [the]
plaintiff').
155. Id. at 622.
156. See also Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831,
844 (6th Cir. 1983) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (describing Motschenbacher as
"an 'identifying characteristics' case").
157. See supra note 154 (noting that the commercial did not use the
plaintiff's name, picture, or a look-alike).
158. The court's acknowledgement that Lombardo's image may have been
misappropriated by the use of a band conductor at a New Year's Eve party
prevents other people from acting in this capacity.
159. These were the only factors that could have identified Lombardo
because neither his face, name nor physical likeness were used. See supra note
154 and accompanying text.
19951
Washington University Open Scholarship
236 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 47:213
many New Year's Eve parties. Even if the public tends to
associate New Year's Eve parties with "Mr. New Year's Eve,"
the plaintiff should not have a cause of action because the
commercial invoked none of his unique attributes. 16
The Sixth Circuit extended the right of publicity to a phrase
associated with a performer in Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable
Toilets, Inc.161 In that case, Johnny Carson objected to the
defendant's use of the phrase, "Here's Johnny.' 1 62 Carson used
the phrase on every episode of the "Tonight Show" since 1962,
and also as a label on his own line of clothing. 63 Although the
court rejected Carson's claims for relief under trademark and
invasion of privacy theories, the court allowed Carson's claim
under the right of publicity theory.' 64 By protecting the phrasei
under the right of publicity, 65 the Carson court may have gone
too far.
Carson extended the right of publicity far beyond earlier
precedents. The court compared the case to Hirsch v. S.C.
Johnson & Co.,' 66 in which "Crazy Legs" Hirsch was entitled
to bring an action against a pantyhose maker who used his
nickname. 67 The phrase "Here's Johnny," however, is not
distinctive enough to qualify for protection under the Hirsch
test. 6' The Hirsch court protected the phrase "Crazy Legs"
because it served as a distinctive nickname for the plaintiff. 69
The phrase "Here's Johnny" is not distinctive. 170 It is used to
160. The right of publicity is designed to prevent a person's identity from
being misappropriated, but a person's identity cannot be invoked by charac-
teristics which are not identifying. See supra note 13 and accompanying text
(emphasizing that the right of publicity is desigded to protect a person's
identity).
161. 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir 1983).
162. Id. at 833.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 834.
165. Id. at 835-37 (explaining that defendant violated Carson's right of
publicity by using the phrase "Here's Johnny").
166. 280 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1979).
167. Id. at 130. The Hirsch court noted that Elroy Hirsch was indisputably
a nationally-known sports figure. Id. at 131. Hirsch acquired the nickname
"crazy legs" during the fourth game of his first season at the University of
Wisconsin. Id. The name followed Hirsch into a dazzling career as a profes-
sional athlete. Id. Moreover, Hirsch was identified as "crazy legs" when he
subsequently did a number of advertisements. Id.
168. Carson, 698 F.2d at 842 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Hirsch simply
stands for the principle accepted by commentators, if not by courts, that the
right of publicity extends not only to an individual's name but to a nickname
or stage name as well."). Hirsch required that the characteristic used com-
mercially "clearly identify the wronged person." Hirsch, 280 N.W.2d at 137.
The phrase used in Carson was applicable to several other people, and even
toilets, so the phrase did not identify Carson with the same specificity as
Hirsch's nickname did.
169. Hirsch, 280 N.W.2d. at 129.
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introduce anyone named John, not just Johnny Carson. Fur-
thermore, the term "John" is commonly used in reference to
toilets.
The Carson court also relied on Ali for the proposition that
phrases could be protected. 71 Ali, however, is easily distinguish-
able. First, the phrase "the Greatest" was not protected outright
in Ali.72 The Ali court relied on the phrase in connection with
several other factors to prove that the defendant had used a
drawing of All.17 1 Carson's claim was based on the use of the
phrase alone. 74 Second, All used the phrase "the Greatest" to
describe himself, making the connection between the phrase and
himself stronger. 75 By contrast, Ed McMahon introduced Car-
son by the phrase "Here's Johnny." The dissent in Carson
noted that if the phrase should receive protection, McMahon
might have had a stronger claim to it because the phrase was
used by him. 76
Motschenbacher, Lombardo, and Carson raise the possibility
that virtually anything can receive protection under some theory
if it reminds the public of a particular person. 7 7 These cases
the name is not exclusively associated with his identity. Carson, 698 F.2d at
837. A term that is not inherently distinctive may still be entitled to trademark
protection if it has acquired "secondary meaning." Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052 (1988). Basically, if the term over time becomes distinctive, it may be
protected under trademark law despite the fact that the term was merely
descriptive. According to the Carson court, the term "Here's Johnny" is said
to have acquired distinctiveness. Thus, Johnny Carson may be entitled to
trademark protection for the phrase "Here's Johnny," because most of the
public associates the saying with his television show.
171. Carson, 698 F.2d at 835.
172. The All court found Ali's identity invoked by the presence of several
factors associated with Ali, including the phrase "the Greatest." See Ali v.
Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The court made no
statement that Ali's identity would have been invoked by the use of this phrase
alone.
173. Id.
174. Carson did not argue that the plaintiff used any characteristic associated
with him other than the phrase "Here's Johnny." See Carson, 698 F.2d at
832.
175. Id. at 843 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (explaining that the association
between the phrase "the Greatest" and Ali was bolstered by Ali's use of the
phrase to describe himself).
176. Carson, 698 F.2d at 839, n.5 (arguing that McMahon has a competing
interest because he used the phrase in "a distinctive drawn out manner").
177. These cases protected the plaintiffs' right of publicity when the defen-
dants used characteristics that were only marginally associated with the plain-
tiffs. The scope of protection an individual can receive is significantly broadened
when characteristics that are invoked are not identifying, like a name or face.
These cases only required the characteristic being protected to be associated
with the plaintiff in some way.
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use a hybrid of trademark and right of publicity law. Specifi-
cally, the courts in these cases determine whether a particular
attribute is an identifying characteristic for the right of publicity
by asking whether the defendant's conduct causes consumer
confusion. 178 Under the current trend, once something becomes
associated with a person, the right of publicity will protect it. 79
This protection will last the life of the individual and, in some
jurisdictions, even longer. 80 This theory incorporates only the
expansive aspects of trademark law, and neglects typical de-
fenses, like abandonment. 8" This hybrid theory threatens to
engulf much of the public domain by removing any logical
stopping point for the scope of stylistic rights. 82
178. Motschenbacher, Lombardo, and Carson were decided under the right
of publicity, but the characteristics protected in those cases did not invoke
the exclusive identity of the plaintiffs. See, e.g., Carson, 698 F.2d at 837.
The test for determining infringement in these cases resembles the requirement
of consumer confusion in trademark cases. Even though the courts did not
seek a finding that actual confusion had resulted, they tried to determine if
the public associated the characteristics with the plaintiffs. See id. The courts
determined that the defendants invoked the plaintiffs' identities because the
public would be reminded of the plaintiffs. See id.
179. Rather than requiring an identifying characteristic to be protected by
the right of publicity, recent cases only require the characteristic to be
associated with a person. See supra notes 137 and 138 (explaining that in
some jurisdictions the right of publicity has incorporated a trademark like test
for determining copyright infringement, which only requires a characteristic
to be associated with a person, rather than identifying).
180. See Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Social Change, Inc. v. American
Heritage Products, Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 704-05 (Ga. 1982) (holding that the
right of publicity is descendible). But cf. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603
P.2d 425, 430-31 (Cal. 1979) (declaring that the right of publicity is not
descendible). See also Andrew B. Sims, Right of Publicity: Survivability
Reconsidered, 49 FOnDHAm L. REv. 453 (1981) (favoring descendibility for the
right of publicity).
181. See Helfand, supra note 3, at 643-48 (discussing the convergence of
trademark and copyright laws to protect comic strip characters). The charac-
teristics protected by the right of publicity are a part of a person's identity
and cannot be abandoned like a trademark. A trademark can fall into disuse
causing the public's connection between a person and the mark to fade. See
supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text. However, these considerations are
not relevant to the right of publicity. The right of publicity is solely concerned
with whether a person's identity is invoked.
182. The balance between the rights of society and the rights of individuals
is destroyed when individuals are free to intrude upon the public domain. See
Madow, supra note 5, at 239. Requiring characteristics to be identifying, or
requiring similarities between goods to cause actual confusion, limits the extent
to which individuals in the public domain may develop their own unique style
by building on others'. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. The
decisions that weaken these requirements expand individual rights with the
price of taking expression out of the public domain. See generally Madow,
supra note 5 (explaining that when the right of publicity is construed broadly,https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/7
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The Ninth Circuit, however, recently expanded the scope of
stylistic rights without relying on the hybrid analysis. In White
v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 83 the court protected
Vanna White's identity under the right of publicity by ignoring
the theory's limitations.'" Vanna White sued Samsung for mak-
ing a commercial that invoked her letter-turning style.'85 The
commercial's setting resembled the set of Wheel of Fortune,
and the robot hostess in the commercial shared Vanna White's
look and style. 86 The court concluded that White had a viable
cause of action, even though the commercial appropriated none
of her personal attributes. 1' 7 The court decided that the combi-
nation of similar characteristics invoked White's identity. 88 It
did not matter to the White court that no one would believe
the robot was Vanna White; all that mattered was that the
public would be reminded of her. 89
White simultaneously removed a crucial limitation on the right
of publicity and undercut the objectives of copyright law.19°
None of the factors that identified White were unique attributes
she possessed.' 9' The dissent correctly noted that the only reason
the public would associate the commercial with Vanna White
the public domain is diminished). See also Gordon, supra note 61, at 1538
(arguing that intellectual property law attempts to balance the rights of society
against the rights of individuals).
183. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. (1993).
184. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment and required the district court to evaluate White's claims on remand.
Their decision to do so suggests that the right of publicity should be construed
broadly. Id. at 1401.
185. Id. at 1396.
186. The commercial's robot wore a long evening gown, a blond wig, and
jewelry, while turning letters on a game board. Id.
187. Id. at 1402. See also Madow, supra note 5, at 127 (arguing that the
protection the right of publicity gives celebrities is unwarranted because it
unnecessarily depletes the public domain); Dan Hurley, The End of Celebrity,
in PSYCHOL. TODAY, Dec. 1988, at 50, 55 (quoting Vanna White, "I don't
know why this happened to me. I work hard and I'm dedicated, but overall
I'm totally surprised. What did I do to deserve this?").
188. White, 971 F.2d at 1399.
189. Id.
190. The White court disregarded the right of publicity's traditional require-
ment that the characteristic being invoked identify the plaintiff. See supra
note 12 and accompanying text. The image in the commercial was clearly not
that of Vanna White. See White, 989 F.2d at 1513 (rejecting a motion for a
rehearing and a rehearing en banc) (Kozinsky, J., dissenting) (noting that
White's identity was not invoked because none of her attributes were invoked),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
191. In rejecting a motion for rehearing, the Ninth Circuit noted that Ms.
White is not the only woman who owns "nice dresses and jewelry." White,
989 F.2d at 1515.
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was because the robot played the role of a hostess on Wheel of
Fortune.92 Judge Kozinsky, who dissented to the Ninth Circuit's
denial of a rehearing en banc, observed in his dissent that "once
you include the game board, anybody standing beside it - a
brunette woman, a man wearing women's clothes, a monkey in
a wig and gown - would evoke White's image, precisely the
way the robot did."' 93 Furthermore, the copyright holder of the
game show owns the right to the game board and the role of
hostess, not Vanna White. Granting White the ability to control
the use of this image undercuts the value of the copyright.'94
This case may replace the need for hybrid analysis under the
right of publicity because confusion is no longer an element of
the tort at all. 195 Moreover, the expanded right of publicity
threatens to destroy the value of copyright protection' 96 and
bankrupt the public domain by allowing individuals to usurp
the rights of copyright holders and the public. 97
The White court's expansion of the right of publicity leaves
many questions unanswered. Does a person develop a property
right in a style by creating it or by becoming associated with
it?' Beyond that, who, if anyone, should own a style that is
192. Id. at 1515.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1516.
195. The White court found an infringement of the right of publicity with
a characteristic that is neither identifying nor capable of causing confusion
between the plaintiff and the robot in the commercial. The court disregarded
both the traditional requirements of the right of publicity and the hybrid
version of this doctrine. White's identity was not invoked by the commercial
because none of the robot's attributes held an exclusive association with White.
The hybrid analysis does not seem applicable either because it is not possible
for confusion to have resulted from the commercial, since the robot was
clearly not White.
196. If courts allowed people to assert their right of publicity over the use
of characteristics owned by others, copyright holders will lose the ability to
control the use of their property. It is conceivable that after White, a court
might require the copyright holder of Wheel of Fortune to get White's
permission before they replace her, because a replacement would remind the
public of White.
197. If the right of publicity can be extended to include anything that
reminds the public of someone, virtually all characteristics are protectable.
Extending the right of publicity this far will disturb settled expectations of
copyright holders and the public. Copyright holders expect the right to control
the use of their property and the public expects the right to create without
fear of reprisals if their creations remind some members of the public of
another's work or image.
198. The White court protected White's right of publicity for the role she
plays on Wheel of Fortune, even though the role was probably created by the
show's producers. Protecting the right of publicity on the basis of association,
rather than origination, is misguided because no goal of intellectual propertyhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/7
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routinely copied?' 9 One example is Marky Mark, the Calvin
Klein underwear model, who has been credited with initiating a
fashion trend by wearing his pants low and his shirt rolled up,
revealing his underwear label.2m Would a future court recognize
an exclusive right in Marky Mark for the commercial use of
this clothing style? If Marky Mark's manager created the idea,
would his manager own it? And would it matter that the Calvin
Klein underwear was someone else's trademark or copyright? 20'
One academic study has found that "Marky Mark's body"
has become "the locus/vehicle by which Calvin Klein underwear
is sold.'"' Is the public's connection between the underwear
and Marky Mark's body enough to give him an exclusive right
to be the only male model for Calvin Klein?23 If Marky Mark
receives this right, his ownership of the right may survive his
death, leaving Calvin Klein without any model. 204 This theory
law is furthered. Creativity is not promoted and accomplishment is not
rewarded because the creator does not receive the right of publicity. In
addition, the people who receive protection from the right of publicity in these
circumstances are unjustly enriched because their profits come from the work
of others.
199. A style that is widely copied becomes a common element of our
culture. Allowing someone to control the commercial use of style in this
circumstance would allow him or her to censure people who try to portray
our culture truthfully. In addition, the First Amendment principle of promoting
social commentary is undermined by this restriction on expression. See Gordon,
supra note 61 at 1535 (arguing that the First Amendment's goals are under-
mined by expansive intellectual property laws). The justification for this
protection is weakened because the more extensively a style is copied, the less
the public associates the style with its creator.
200. See Phong Luu, Underwear Everywhere, ST. PETERSBURG Tumus, Sept.
22, 1993, at ID (explaining that kids are copying Marky Mark's style of
wearing their pants and shirts to reveal their underwear labels).
201. These issues remain open questions after White. Courts should be
careful to balance the rights of individuals who become associated with a
characteristic, those who created the characteristic, the rights of trademark or
copyright holders that may be effected, and the needs of the public. See also
supra note 5 (emphasizing the need for intellectual property law to balance
the rights of individuals and the public).
202. See Laurence Goldstein, Perspective on the Body: It's Not Just an
Underwear Ad; Images of Physical Perfection and the Brute Male Glamour
Spread a Societal Anxiety Worthy of Academic Study, L.A. TIMms, July 4,
1993, at M5.
203. Marky Mark's association with Calvin Klein underwear may be close
enough to entitle him the same protection White was afforded because of her
association with Wheel of Fortune. Although White was not a challenge
against the show's owners, the court recognized White's right of publicity
irrespective of any ownership of the show's owners. White v. Samsung Elec.
America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397-99 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 2443 (1993). Recognizing that White had a personal right in the role
suggests that the right is enforceable against everyone, including the show's
owners.
204. In some jurisdictions the right of publicity is descendible. See supra
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could conceivably be extended to allow Marky Mark to prevent
any commercial use of a man wearing only underwear. 25 It is
hard to believe that a court would allow any of these results,
but these outcomes are viable unless some limitations are im-
posed on the scope of stylistic rights .2 1
II. PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE IDENTIFICATION OF
STrisnic RIGHTS
Intellectual property law usually attempts to balance the rights
of the individual against the rights of the public. The expanded
scope of stylistic rights destroys this balance °7 and replaces it
with a dysfunctional set of rules governing ownership. 208 The
new intellectual property regime leaves the public unable to
create anything without violating someone's rights °9 and pre-
vents anyone from knowing whose rights are violated. 210 Even
those who are fortunate enough to own an aspect of style under
trademark or copyright law may not have the exclusive right to
note 47 (listing jurisdictions that have adopted this rule by case law and
statutes).
205. The public's association between Marky Mark and Calvin Klein may
include an association with underwear in general. If a mere association with
a characteristic is enough to establish protection under the right of publicity,
Marky Mark's association with underwear may entitle him broad protection
under the right of publicity.
206. The Marky Mark hypotheticals are designed to show the dangers of
removing the limitations on the scope of traditional intellectual property
doctrines. Limits must be placed on these doctrines if the original balance
between the rights of individuals and society is to be restored.
-207. The potentially unlimited expansion of stylistic rights gives individuals
the power to absorb much of the public domain and to intrude on the rights
others hold under trademark and copyright law. See supra notes 5 and 181
and accompanying text (describing the traditional balance of rights established
by intellectual property law and how the current expansion of stylistic rights
threatens to destroy it).
208. See Madow supra note 5 (explaining the benefits of maintaining a
balance between individual and societal rights under intellectual property law).
Destroying this balance through the expansion of stylistic rights threatens to
undermine creative forces because people will be afraid that their creation will
violate someone else's rights.
209. An unlimited scope for stylistic rights allows individuals to extend their
rights at the expense of the public domain. When the public domain is
diminished, the public has fewer resources to freely build upon. See supra
note 85-86 and accompanying text (explaining that the ability to build upon
other peoples work to some extent is an essential part of the creative process).
210. Stylistic rights would be difficult to identify if they were construed to
protect aspects of individual's personas that are merely associated with them.
The same trait may remind different members of the public of different
people. This may make it difficult for those who would like to purchase rights
to identify the owner of such rights.
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that style because someone else may possess an overlapping right
under the right of publicity. 21'
Courts' reliance on a variety of legal theories to protect style
makes it difficult to determine the source of protection.2 12 Some
of the legal theories protecting style do so because the style
belongs to its creator.213 Other branches of intellectual property
law, such as copyright, protect style because it is embodied in
a work.214 When courts blend these distinct theories together,
ownership of stylistic rights becomes difficult to determine. 21 5
This problem generally arises when the creator no longer owns
the work that embodies the style he created. 21 6 The need for a
more rational approach becomes apparent in cases where copy-
right owners and copyright creators sue each other. 21 7
One of the earliest cases of this kind was the famous "Sam
Spade" case21 ' in which the parties disputed the ownership of
211. An owner of a right to an aspect of style under copyright or trademark
may not be able to use this right if doing so would interfere with someone
else's right of publicity. Copyright holders, for example, would also have a
hard time selling their rights if buyers were uncertain of what the rights
entitled them to do.
212. Courts frequently combine the doctrines protecting style or conclude
that a violation of one doctrine is the equivalent to a violation of all: See
Helfand, supra note 3, at 623 ("In the 1970s, however, a transition began
that resulted in convergence - the phenomenon where courts view copyright,
trademark, and unfair competition claims as though they are coequal and
necessarily interrelated.").
213. The right of publicity is a personal right, designed to protect an
individual's persona. Trademark and copyright law protect the thing subject
to protection. See supra notes 12-31 and accompanying text (discussing the
right of publicity, copyright, and trademark).
214. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text (discussing copyright law
and its objective as a doctrine under intellectual property).
215. The White case is an example of this because under White, the Wheel
of Fortune hostess is subject to copyright protection by the show's owner and
White's own right of publicity. If someone wished to create a Wheel of
Fortune II, based on the original program, it is unclear whether the rights to
do so would have to be purchased from White and the shows owners. See
also Goodis v. United Artisth Television, Inc., 425 F.2d 397, 405-06 (2d Cir.
1970) (considering the implications that recognizing a right in style may have
on other potentially interested parties).
216. It makes little difference which legal theory protects a person's right
to style when the creator owns his own work, because no one else will have
a claim to the work. When the rights to the work are sold, however, the
original classification of the rights may become problematic. For example, a
creator who owns the copyright to a work in which an aspect of the style is
protected by the right of publicity may sell the copyright and retain his right
of publicity. When more than one party possesses overlapping rights to the
same work, it may be difficult to determine the extent to which one party
can exercise his rights without the other's consent.
217. See, e.g., Goodis, 425 F.2d at 405-06.
218. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 216
F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 971 (1955).
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the character Sam Spade. The plaintiff had purchased the copy-
right to the book The Maltese Falcon and made it into a very
successful movie. 2 9 The book's author, Dashiell Hammett, later
wrote stories for C.B.S. radio broadcasts using the book's Sam
Spade character. 22 The plaintiff claimed that the defendant's
use of Sam Spade in its radio broadcasts infringed their copy-
right to The Maltese Falcon.221
The court concluded that Hammett had not transferred his
rights to the character when he sold the book.m The court held
that Hammett did not sell the character with the copyright
because Sam Spade is merely the vehicle for telling the story
and not the story itself?2 The court refused to believe that
Hammett intended to convey all rights to the character because
writers often use the same character from one book in later
works 4.22
This case raises several questions about the value of the
copyright the plaintiff purchased. Copyright protects the original
work and its derivatives,2 so the book and the movie are both
protected. The copyrighted material also contains the characters,
so it would seem that the plaintiff could use them in derivative
works. 226 They could even write stories in the same style as
219. Id. at 949-50.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 948-49.
222. Id. at 948-50.
223. Id. at 950. The court noted: "It is conceivable that the character really
constitutes the story being told, but if the character is only the chessman in
the game of telling the story he is not within the area of the protection
afforded by the copyright." Id. See also Helfand, supra note 3, at 633 (noting
that the application of this test affords limited protection because if Sam
Spade is not the "story being told" it is difficult to imagine any character
who would be). But see Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 345 F. Supp. 108,
113 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir.
1978), cert. denied sub nom., O'Neil v. Walt Disney Prods., 439 U.S. 1132
(1979), (weakening the "story being told" test by concluding that Mickey
Mouse was the story being told).
224. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 216 F.2d at 949 (noting that the practice
of an author using the same character in different books is well documented,
a practice used by Edgar Allen Poe, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, S.S. Van Dine,
Earle Stanley Gardner, and others).
225. See supra notes 88 and 90 (defininj the terms "original" and "deriv-
ative works" in the modem Copyright Act).
226. This is an issue the courts have not addressed. It is clear from the
court's holding that Hammett could continue to use the character, but it seems
that Warner Brothers would also be able to use the character in derivative
works. See Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(allowing the copyright owner of pictures that contain "Dr. Seuss" characters
to create dolls based on the pictures, even though the creator retained the
ownership of the characters).-If Warner Brothers and Hammett both produced
"Sam Spade" stories, it might have been very difficult for the public to tellhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/7
STYLISTIC RIGHTS
Hammett because the court held that his style was not unique
to the mystery genre. m The value of the plaintiff's right to the
character is undermined, however, because the ownership is not
exclusive.
The court -in Geisel v. Poynter Products, Inc.229 reached a
different conclusion on similar issues. Geisel involved the own-
ership of characters created by "Dr. Seuss" and the right of
the defendants to use the creator's pen-name.2 0 The plaintiff
sold the defendant the copyright to cartoons containing his
famous characters. 1 The defendant later created dolls based on
the drawings in the cartoons. 212 The early dolls bore labels
indicating that the dolls were designed by Dr. Seuss. 213 Later
dolls had labels which explained that the dolls were derived
from illustrations by Dr. Seuss. 214
Unlike the court in the Sam Spade case, the Geisel court
concluded that the characters were subject to copyright protec-
tion.23 The copyright gave the defendant the right to transform
the two-dimensional figures into a three-dimensional doll. 236 The
court emphasized that the defendant could make the doll because
it was derived solely from the cartoon they owned, and none
of Dr. Seuss' other works.237
The court even recognized the defendant's right to use the
name Dr. Seuss in association with the dolls.2 8 It was not unfair
the products apart. This raises the problems of consumer confusion and
trademark dilution, which trademark and unfair competition laws are designed
to prevent. For a discussion of these theories see supra notes 16-25 and
accompanying text.
227. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 216 F.2d at 951 (explaining that the
similarities between the stories, such as a long complicated search for an
extremely valuable object, complications along the way, and fatalities, are not
unique to Hammett, but are used by many mystery writers). See also supra
notes 86-87 (explaining that a commonly used plot sequence often lacks the
originality necessary to be afforded copyright protection).
228. The potential for competition between Warner Brothers and Hammett
reduced the value of "Sam Spade" stories because the competition might have
reduce prices and lead to the public tiring of "Sam Spade."
229. 295 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
230. Id. at 333.
231. Id. at 342.
232. Id. at 347 (noting that the defendant's counsel insisted that the defen-
dant should not consult any source outside the copyrighted material they
owned in designing the doll).
233. Id. at 348-49.
234. Id. at 349-50.
235. The court in the "Sam Spade" case determined that the character was
not subject to copyright protection. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 971
(1955).
236. Geisel, 295 F. Supp. at 353-54.
237. Id. at 354.
238. Id. ("That ownership must include some right to use the name 'Dr.
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competition for the defendant to show that the dolls were derived
from Dr. Seuss' drawings because the dolls were derived from
Dr. Seuss' drawings.239 The defendant's use of the early labels
implying that Dr. Seuss had designed the dolls was improper,
however, because this was not true.240 This did not violate
Geisel's right of publicity because he had sold the right to use
his name in this context because his name was on the copyrighted
material. 24"
These two cases illustrate the confusion buyers and sellers
confront regarding the rights exchanged in a transaction. The
purchasers of the copyright in Sam Spade felt they had been
deprived of a right they purchased. Geisel, in contrast, discov-
ered that he had inadvertently transferred more rights than he
intended.
Determining infringement of protected style is more difficult
when the subject matter involves more subjective components. 242
The subjects of the controversies in Warner and Geisel were
easy to spot because they were characters easily identifiable by
name or appearance. 243 Some aspects of style are more difficult
to identify and, consequently, harder to protect.2 "
The court in Franklin Mint Corporation v. National Wildlife
Art Exchange, Inc.245 had to determine whether an artist plagia-
rized himself by copying a work he had previously sold. 246 The
Seuss' because that name appeared on each of the pages of cartoons [the
defendant purchased].").
239. Id. at 351 (citing Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924)
(noting that when a mark "is used in a way that does not deceive the public"
and the mark is used to "tell the truth," the mark is not used improperly).
240. Geisel, 295 F. Supp. at 352-53. The Geisel court explained that the
early labels violated Geisel's trademark because the label falsely implied that
Dr. Seuss created the dolls. The later labels, which explained that the doll
was based on Dr. Seuss' designs, were acceptable. Id.
241. Id. at 355-56.
242. Objective similarities, like the same names or faces, can be identified
with little confusion. Determining infringement of more subjective elements
of style is more difficult because people may view a person's style differently.
This danger is reduced by requiring the style to be distinctive, but it may not
make infringement as easy to determine as objective factors.
243. The infringing marks in those cases could be determined objectively
because they involved a name and a cartoon character.
244. See supra notes 105-14 (highlighting the difficulty of determining
infringement on the basis of subjective factors).
245. 575 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978).
246. Id. at 63. See also Esquire, Inc. v. Varga Enters., Inc., 81 F. Supp.
306 (N.D. Ill. 1948), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 185 F.2d 14 (7th Cir.
1950). In Varga, an artist painted semi-nude women in a style that exaggerated
their torsos and elongated their legs. 81 F. Supp. at 307. These popular
pictures were published in Esquire and the women in the drawings were known
as "Varga girls." Id. The artist ceased providing Esquire with his paintings,https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/7
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artist specialized in painting wildlife and had sold the copyright
to a painting of a cardinal to the National Wildlife Art Ex-
change. 2A7 The artist later painted a series of four pictures of
birds, including one of a cardinal, and sold the copyright to the
Franklin Mint.m The artist relied on the same source materials
for painting both cardinals, including photographs of the birds
and preliminary sketches.m9 The National Wildlife Art Exchange
sued the Franklin Mint for copyright infringement. 20
The court's first major hurdle was deciding which aspects of
the paintings were protected by the copyright. Wildlife pictures
have to be very precise. This limits the amount of unique
expression an artist can create and copyright.251 The court de-
but he continued to paint his "Varga girls." Id. Esquire sued to prevent him
from using the title "Varga girls" and to keep him from painting in his
traditional style. Id. The court reasoned that the phrase "Varga girl" belonged
to Esquire because it was a benefit they received from the contract. Id. at
309. The court, however, concluded that Esquire had not purchased the artist's
style, even though it owned all previous commercial productions of the "Varga
girls." Id. The court concluded that this distinctive style was all the artist
painted, so all of his paintings should be expected to share the stylistic
similarities. The court determined that there was no infringement because none
of the new paintings were direct copies. Id. at 306-09.
The Varga court evidently chose to protect the interest of the artist over
the property interest of the copyright holder. Varga's artistic style became
better defined as his works evolved, but each stage of his artistic style was
owned by the plaintiff. After painting more than 100 of his first paintings
for the plaintiff, the court could have concluded that Varga's distinctive style
was owned by Esquire.
247. Franklin Mint, 575 F.2d at 63-64.
248. Id.
249. Id. See also Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1532 (9th Cir.
1993) (explaining that even subconscious copying violates copyright) rev'd, 114
S. Ct. 1023 (1993); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d
738, 741 (9th Cir. 1971) (concluding that copying an "expression" is not
prohibited when the expression is inseparable from the idea); Winthol v. Wells,
231 F.2d 550, 552-53 (7th Cir. 1956) (copying done from memory is as
objectionable as making copies from more direct sources).
250. Franklin Mint, 575 F.2d at 63.
251. Judge Weis explaiued that the genre the artist creates within may
determine the ease with which infringement can be determined:
[Iun the world of fine art, the ease with which a copyright may
be delineated may depend on the artist's style. A painter like
Monet when dwelling upon impressions created by light on the
facade of the Rouen Cathedral is apt to create a work which can
make infringement attempts difficult. On the other hand, an artist
who produces a rendition with photograph-like clarity and accuracy
may be hard pressed to prove unlawful copying by another who
uses the same subject matter and the same technique.
Franklin Mint, 575 F.2d at 65. See Brownlee, supra note 28, at 1176 (explaining
that artists who design in a realistic style have a more difficult time proving
infringement).
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termined that no infringement had occurred because the paint-
ings were not copies.2 2 There were differences in the birds'
positioning on the branches and their behavior in the paintings. 211
The court felt that artists should be allowed to return to the
same theme time after time, so long as they do not copy their
earlier works.2 4
The current system for establishing a copyright makes it
difficult to determine who owns the style embodied in a work. 255
Copyright law protects unique forms of expression from the
moment of creation.2 6 This means that a copyright is established
on the preliminary work that goes into creating the final prod-
uct. 257 For example, if an artist designed a sculpture and relied
on preliminary sketches, the sketches would be the original and
the sculpture the derivative. Style that may appear unique to
the sculpture may actually be protected by the copyright for the
preliminary sketches. If the style is present in the preliminary
work, the right to the style is, retained by the owner of the
preliminary work.2 8 If the "unique" style exists only in the
final product, the right to the style is contained in the copyright
to that work alone. 259 People looking to buy "original" works
need to be aware of the preliminary material the work is based
upon to determine which rights they would be purchasing. 260
252. Franklin Mint, 575 F.2d at 65-66.
253. Id. at 66.
254. The court noted the tendency of many painters to return to the same
themes. Painting variations of a theme is appropriate, so long as they are not
direct copies of copyrighted works that belong to someone else. Id.
255. See generally Page, supra note 27 (describing the protection derivative
works receive under copyright). Artists would be reluctant to sell their works
immediately after they are painted if the right to paint variations of the scene
in the same style was sold with the work.
256. 17 U.S.C § 101 provides:
A work is 'created' when it is fixed in a copy or phonorecord
for the first time; where a work is prepared over a period of time,
the portion of it that has been fixed at any particular time
constitutes the work as of that time, and where the work has been
prepared in different versions, each version constitutes a separate
work.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
257. See Page, supra note 27, at 429-32 (explaining that all preliminary
works are works in and of themselves, and are entitled to copyright protection).
258. This is because copyright protects the unique elements of a work as
they appear in the original. Preliminary work is created before the final
product is made, so the copyright to the unique stylistic elements lies in the
original. See supra notes 27 and 28 (describing copyright requirements of
original expression). See also Page, supra note 27 at 425-30 (explaining the
problem of determining which work holds the copyright to the unique aspects
of an artists style).
259. Id.
260. There is a danger that people may purchase a final product, believinghttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/7
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Markets that are style-oriented suffer from the inability to
distinguish between protected style and unprotected style. Some
art critics, for example, fear that this confusion has destroyed
an entire genre, known as haute kitsch. 26' This genre portrays
images from advertisements and the popular culture in a "sly,
poke-in-the-ribs subtext."262 Rogers v. Koons261 may have de-
stroyed this field of art.26 Jeff Koons created a series of statues
based on the plaintiff's popular picture of a couple holding a
litter of puppies.25 Koons' style is described by some critics as
an "ironic critique of consumerism," ' 2 66 and by others as "pla-
giarism. '267 The court concluded that Koons violated the plain-
tiff's copyright because his subtle changes did not produce a
creation, only a copy.2
Advertising has also suffered from the inability to determine
whether style is protected. Cases like Midler and Waits "sent a
chill through the advertising world. ' 269 Advertisers fear that
courts may find infringement when similarities are not as blatant
as they were in Midler and Waits.2 70 If this occurs, advertisers
may be hesitant to create at all for fear of being sued.271
that this work is an original. If the purchaser buys the work expecting to sell
derivatives, the purchaser may be disappointed to learn that another holds the
copyright to the unique aspects of the work. For this reason, buyers should
persuade the seller to warrant that the work sold is not based on any previous
material. See Page, supra note 27, at 339-42 (encouraging the use of warranties
to protect the expectations of contracting parties).
261. See, e.g., Charlotte Low Allen, Lawsuit Asks if Art is More than
Tales of Puppies, WASH. TimEs, Aug. 3, 1990, at El (arguing that the genre
was destroyed because courts view it as copying, rather than a unique form
of expression).
262. Id.
263. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 365 (1992).
264. See Allen, supra note 261, at El (explaining that some art critics feel
that a genre was destroyed by this decision).
265. Koons modified the faces of the people in the picture. See Rogers,
960 F.2d at 303-05.
266. See Allen, supra note 261, at El.
267. Id. (suggesting that the work had been so substantially copied that it
was essentially plagiarized); Rogers, 960 F.2d at 311.
268. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 311.
269. Bibisi, supra note 8, at E8.
270. Peter Stranger, president of a major Los Angeles advertising Agency,
explained, "I'm not afraid of these clear-cut cases .... I'm afraid of getting
sued out of the blue by using someone's voice unknowingly. That does scare
me." Bibisi, supra note 8, at El.
271. Id. (explaining that the Midler and Waits rulings should put an end
to the commercial use of sound-alikes and warning that more expansive
declarations of rights may chill other aspects of the advertising market as
well).
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Even when rights are recognized, a problem still exists re-
garding how the rights may be purchased. 272 Young & Rubicam,
the agency that made the Midler sound-alike commercial, thought
they would be protected by purchasing the rights to use Midler's
song. 2 3 After their loss, representatives of the firm noted that
the decision may come back to haunt performers because agen-
cies will be hesitant to use their work, reducing the value of
their royalties. 274
The Ninth Circuit, in Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty,2 1 indicated
that it is possible for an artist to sell the exclusive rights to his
or her musical style.276 The suit involved a claim against John
Fogerty for the infringement of a copyright that he had previ-
ously sold.277 John Fogerty recorded "Run Through the Jungle"
("Jungle") in 1970 and sold the exclusive rights to the song. 27
Fantasy later purchased these rights.279 In 1985, Fogerty recorded
"The Old Man Down the Road" ("Old Man"). 20 Fantasy
thought "Old Man" was so similar to "Jungle" that it violated
their right to create derivative works. 281 Although the jury re-
272. The expanded scope of stylistic rights makes it more difficult for
people to know what rights they must purchase to be able to use material,
such as songs. In Midler, for example, the defendant had purchased the right
to use the song, but nevertheless violated Midler's right of publicity for having
the song sung the way Midler would have sung it. Midler v. Ford Motor Co.,
849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1513 (1992).
If the rights to style are construed broadly, it becomes more difficult for
copyright holders to exercise their rights without interfering with the conflicting
rights of the original artist. Copyright holders can purchase these additional
rights from the artist, but this is an additional and potentially unwarranted
burden placed on the copyright holder. Performers may be hurt in the process
because the value of their royalties may decrease as the potential litigation
costs for using their material increases.
273. Midler, 849 F.2d at 462.
274. Robert Callagy, attorney for Ford and Young & Rubicam, explained
that the Midler ruling will hurt songwriter's music royalties because advertisers
will be less inclined to use widely known songs. Richard B. Schmitt, Imitation:
Flattery or theft?, ST. PETERSBuRo TmsES, Sept. 3, 1988, at ID. He explained
that to the extent courts "preclude a use such as this, you as a copyright
holder are going to lose a market for licensing rights." Id.
275. 984 F.2d 1524, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1047 (1993).
276. Fantasy, Inc., 984 F.2d at 1532 (concluding that the defendant's suit
was not frivolous because Fogerty would have violated the copyright he sold
if he had subconsciously copied that work). See also Geller and Hines, supra
note 7, at S9 (suggesting that the Fogerty holding could potentially restrict
the rights of artists to create within their style after they have sold the
copyright to some of their work).
277. Fantasy, Inc., 984 F.2d at 1526-27.
278. Id. at 1526.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Fantasy, Inc., 984 F.2d at 1526-28 (arguing that Fogerty had not sunghttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/7
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jected the claim, the court recognized the possibility of a cause
of action. 2S2 The district court stated that "if Fogerty's Old Man
is a derivative work of Jungle, then Fogerty has exercised one
of the exclusive rights that he had previously granted to plain-
tiff." 283 Under these facts, the district court held that the plain-
tiff could sue Fogerty for copyright infringement. 214
Mr. Fogerty correctly observed that "the larger issue [was]
whether composers, writers, and artists could be barred from
creating new works that bear the stamp of their own distinctive
style." 5 If Fogerty's "swamp rock" 2 sound is distinctive enough
to be copyrighted, it can be sold with the copyright. 2 7 Many
artists will find this possibility troubling. On the one hand,
copyright protection for stylistic rights is a great way to intim-
idate potential impostors32 On the other hand, most of the
artists who have sold the copyrights to their works probably
never considered the possibility that they could be selling the
backbone of their careers.2
The value of works with distinctive stylistic components is
threatened by an inability to predict the protected status of the
work's style. 290 Additionally, the inability to distinguish between
the same exact song, but a variation that was so similar that it infringed on
their right to create a derivative work).
282. Id. at 1532. See also Katherine Bishop, A Victory for the Creative
Process, N.Y. TIams, Nov. 11, 1988, at B5 (explaining that the jury reached
its decision after just two hours, with one member of the jury explaining,
"Creative people have got to have rights to create without being harassed by
too many business types").
283. Fantasy Inc. v. Fogerty, 654 F. Supp. 1129, 1132 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
284. Id.
285. Bishop, supra note 282, at B5.
286. See id. (stating that Fogerty describes his unique sound as "swamp
rock").
287. If style is distinctive enough to be copyrightable it becomes a part of
the copyrighted material, along with the lyrics. Once the style is embodied in
the copyright, the artist can sell the copyright and all that the copyright
protects, including the style.
288. Artists gain more power to protect their style from copying when their
rights are construed broadly.
289. This right may operate as a double-edged sword when the artist sells
copyright rights because the right can then be used against the original
copyright holder. The original artist may be hurt the most in these circum-
stances because he or she may only be commercially successful within a narrow
stylistic range.
290. The problem of selling the rights to an artist's style is only present
when the artist's style is distinctive enough to be protected. If an artist sells
the rights to his work he, as well as others, can continue to use the style if
it is not distinctive enough to be protected. The value of an artist's work may
depend heavily on whether the artist's style is entitled to protection. The
problem is that there is no way to predict whether a person's style is distinctive
enough to receive protection from intellectual property laws.
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the public domain and protected style may reduce the incentive
for the public to create. Work that has already been created
may lose its value because people cannot determine what rights
will be conveyed with the work. Purchasers are as worried about
buying works they do not need as buyers may be about inad-
vertently selling all rights to their style.29' A reliable method for
determining whether style is protected and how it can be trans-
ferred must be developed for market forces to function properly.
III. PROPOSAL: PLACING LIMITS ON STYLISTIC RIGHTS AND
UTILIZING WARRANTIES TO NEGOTIATE THEIR TRANSFER
A. Maintain the Distinctions Between Legal Theories
The legal theories protecting style operate effectively when the
standards for infringement are tied to their respective goals. 292
Merging the different theories that protect style has led to results
that do not further the goals of any distinct theory. 293 The goals
of protecting a person's identity or preventing consumer con-
fusion, for example, place logical limits on the scope of stylistic
rights. 294 Without these limitations, the decision to protect a
person's style becomes arbitrary and unpredictable.
Untangling these legal theories will narrow the scope of sty-
listic rights. 295 The right of publicity should not protect a per-
291. Young & Rubicam, for example, probably regret buying the rights to
Bette Midler's song Do You Want to Dance? for their commercial because it
did not give them the rights to make their commercial. Midler, 849 F.2d at
460. Artists may fear that selling their work may result in inadvertently selling
their style.
292. The balance between the rights of individuals and society is maintained
when intellectual property doctrines are applied only as far as necessary to
protect the goals of intellectual property. See supra notes 5 and 181 (explaining
that intellectual property law tries to maintain a balance between protecting
the rights of individuals to their creations and the rights of the public to an
expansive public domain). See also Madow, supra note 5 (urging that this
balancing particularly be applied to curtail the expanding right of publicity).
293. See supra note 182 (explaining that merging the tests of distinct
intellectual property doctrines frequently leads to results which undermine the
public domain without furthering the goals of the doctrines used to protect
individuals' creations).
294. The goal of the right of publicity, for example, is to protect a person's
ability to control the commercial use of his or her identity. Requiring that a
person's identity is actually invoked to constitute a violation of the right of
publicity assures that this goal is protected without unnecessarily reducing the
public domain. See supra note 182 (explaining how the merger of tests for
distinct intellectual property doctrines undermines the goals of intellectual
property).
295. The convergence of the doctrines protecting style has broadened the
protection the doctrines provide without furthering their goals. Restoring
traditional limits of these doctrines will help to preserve the public domain.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urba law/vol47/iss1/7
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son's commercial use of things associated with him unless the
connection between them is strong enough to invoke his identity
alone. Likewise, trademark and unfair competition law should
not protect the commercial use of something unless protection
is necessary to prevent consumer confusion regarding the source
of the goods or services. Copyright law would require a "sub-
stantial similarity" to exist in order to prove infringement, 29
rather than simply enough of a similarity to cause confusion.
B. Limit the Scope of the Right of Publicity
The right of publicity is designed to prevent others from
becoming unjustly enriched by appropriating another person's
identity. This protection should only extend to characteristics
which are truly identifying, not just associated with someone.2 97
Protected characteristics should also be ones that the person
whose identity is invoked would have a right to use freely. 29
A person should not be able to invoke the right of publicity
to protect a characteristic he or she does not have a right to
use freely. People who can be identified by characteristics some-
one else owns are unjustly enriched when they can prevent the
copyright holder from using his or her rights. Vanna White has
a right to associate herself with Wheel of Fortune and no one
has the right to separate Marky Mark from his Calvins. 299 These
rights do not give Vanna or Marky the exclusive right to control
the copyrighted material, and the right of publicity should not
be construed to achieve this result. If individuals want the
exclusive rights, they should purchase them from the copyright
holder. 300
296. This is the traditional requirement of copyright law. See supra notes
26-31 for a discussion of traditional application of the test for copyright
infringement.
297. See supra notes 176-82 and accompanying text (describing the problems
with extending the right of publicity to protect characteristics that are not
identifying).
298. See supra notes 183-97 and accompanying text (describing the problems
with the White decision, in which the court protected White's association with
a game show she did not own).
299. See Ann Cooper, Gathering Moss; Neil Kraft Updates Calvin Klein
with a '90s-Style Controversy, Kate Moss, ADWEEK, Nov. 29, 1993, at 33
(observing the phrase "Nothing comes between me and my Calvins" was
previously used by actress Brooke Shields).
300. See, e.g., Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th
Cir. 1970) (holding that Goodyear's use of "These Boots Were Made for
Walkin"' did not violate Nancy Sinatra's right of publicity because she lacked
a distinctive style). Judge Trask explained, "Had she desired to exclude all
others from the use of the song so that her 'secondary meaning' with the
song could not be imitated she could have purchased those rights from the
copyright proprietor." Id. at 716. This rule would protect the value of the
copyright by preserving the copyright holders right to exclusive ownership.
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C. Rely on Warranties to Negotiate Transactions
People should protect their interests by stating specifically
which interests they are transferring and which they wish to
retain.301 When a purchaser intends to use the material for a
particular purpose, he or she should require the seller to include
a warranty. This would foster efficient transactions because both
parties would know exactly which elements of style the contract
transferred.
Warranties may be particularly important when the transfer
involves copyrighted material. °2 Potential buyers cannot deter-
mine the scope of a work's derivative rights unless they are
aware of the material relied upon by the work's creator.3 3
Copyright protects preliminary works, like rough drafts and
preliminary sketches.? 4 Protection for this preliminary work
reduces the protection otherwise afforded the final product.3 5
Copyright purchasers interested in the value of derivative works
should learn about the artist's earlier work. Purchasers may
want to purchase the earlier work or ask the creator to warrant
that the work they do purchase was not based on any preexisting,
copyrighted material. Conversely, an artist may want to create
and retain the preliminary work to preserve the ownership of
his or her distinctive style.
CONCLUSION
A person's distinctive style may receive protection from pri-
vacy law, trademark, unfair compretition, and copyright, or a
combination of these theories. The recent expansion and merger
of these doctrines has removed the limits constraining the scope
of these rights. This expansion threatens to bankrupt the public
domain and to leave a dysfunctional set of rules governing
intellectual property in its place.
301. Contract warranties allow contracting parties to protect their interests
by explicitly providing for what is exchanged. See Page, supra note 27. Page
advocates using contract warranties to protect the interests of people who
purchase works with the intent of creating derivatives. Id. at 437-38. The
warranties need only provide that the work being transferred is not based on
any other protected work. Id.
302. See generally Page, supra note 27 (explaining that warranties are the
best way for contracting parties to protect their interests).
303. Id. See also supra notes 90 and 107 (defining derivative works under
the Copyright Act).
304. See supra note 107 (explaining that even preliminary work is protected
by copyright).
305. See supra notes 255-60 and accompanying text (explaining that prelim-
inary work can posses the copyright that purchasers of a final product may
believe they own).https://op nscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/7
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Courts should restrict the scope of stylistic rights by carefully
tailoring the scope of the rights to the goals of the laws that
protect them. A return to the traditional application of these
doctrines would require courts to maintain the distinctions be-
tween the various theories protecting style and to limit appli-
cation of the right of publicity. Accordingly, courts can restore
the balance between private and public ownership by delimiting
the bounds of protected style. Restoring the public-private bal-
ance traditionally respected by intellectual property law properly
benefits society by protecting unique styles that deserve protec-
tion and by opening new avenues for innovation.
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